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Abstract 
Agricultural food prices are increasing with important social repercussions. Within the last 
few years, the amount of people suffering from starvation due to soaring staple food prices 
has increased dramatically. Among the most common source of agricultural price increase 
is speculation and especially index traders. This paper explores the relationship between 
index traders and agricultural commodities. It examines the importance of index traders’ 
positions compared to that of other traders. By updating a study from Sanders et al (2010) 
to the 2006-April 2012 period, it applies traditional methodology (Working, 1960) to 
suggest a new approach focusing exclusively on index traders. It concludes that index 
traders’ participation in agricultural commodities markets are increasing as much as 
commercial traders’ participation. As a result, the role of index traders may be regarded as 
an asset value to future agricultural commodity markets. The participation of index traders 
may only be excessive on the wheat traded in the Chicago Board of Trade market.  
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1. Introduction 
The goal of this dissertation is to gain a better insight about the importance of index traders 
in agricultural commodities. The role of index traders will be more or less relevant 
depending on the participation of other traders on agricultural future markets. The work 
will first review and update a study by Sanders et al (2010) which addresses this question. 
These authors applied a methodology designed by Working (1960). Later, and by applying 
the same method, it will propose a new approach with a specific focus on the intervention 
of index traders.  
 
The pertinence of this investigation question arises from the current food crisis, its negative 
social repercussions and the ongoing economic and financial instability. Agricultural prices 
have been increasing in the last years, but with an instable evolution. There are still 
millions of undernourished people in the world and when food prices rise, more people 
starve. Among all causes of food staple price soars, speculation has been indicated as one 
of the main causes. Agricultural commodities are traded in future markets since they have 
the crucial role of risk transference. However, not only hedgers trade on these markets. 
Financial traders also invest in agricultural commodities and, in fact, are the responsible for 
providing market liquidly and promoting price discovery. Although their role is crucial, 
certain authors (Wahl, 2009; Schutter, 2010; Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele, 2010;) argue 
that speculation is causing more harm than good and propose to pose greater barriers to 
financial investors in these commodities.  
 
Amongst the different types of financial investors, index traders deserve particular attention 
due to their characteristics and investment mechanism. Authors (Masters and White,2008; 
Abbott et. al, 2011) who write about a negative impact from index traders base their 
arguments on the fact that these traders mainly hold net long positions and trade significant 
amounts of positions and money, inducing prices soars in agricultural future markets. Still, 
there are authors (Irwin and Sanders, 2010; Sanders et al, 2010; Stoll and Whaley, 2010) 
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that highlight that financial traders and particularly index traders do not play a major role 
on agricultural future markets and are not able to influence prices.  
 
Despite these contrasting perspectives, open questions remain and they required an answer. 
A major one is to evaluate the importance of speculators regarding the importance of other 
traders. Speculators’ participation on agricultural derivative markets is indispensable. The 
question is: when do they become dispensable? More to this, index traders’ positions would 
only be excessive when compared to other traders’ positions. This research work will 
compare and contrast different traders’ positions and examine the importance of index 
traders in agricultural commodity futures markets in the recent years. Sanders et al (2010) 
address this issue using 2006-2008 data while applying Working (1960) methodology. Due 
to the current financial and food crisis and the world economic instability, Sanders et al 
(2010) conclusions may require revision. Hence as aforementioned the first contribution of 
this paper will be updating Sanders et al (2010) study. In particular, the author will use 
2006-April 2012 data provided by Supplemental Commodity Index (CIT) report. This 
report is published by US Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC) and provides 
detailed weekly data on the open interest hold by reportable traders (commercial - long and 
short-, noncommercial- long, short and spreading - and index traders - long and short) and 
non-reportable traders for 12 agricultural commodities. 
 
Sanders et al (2010) used a methodology designed by Holbrook Working (1960) 
specifically to agricultural commodity derivative markets. The Speculative Index measures 
the excess of speculation according to hedging. Yet this method has two major limitations. 
One was emphasized already in the 1960’s and resolves around the treatment to non-
reportable traders. The purpose of these traders is unknown and therefore they cannot be 
allocated to any of the reportable positions. The higher the non-reportable participation, the 
less accurate is the Speculative Index. Some authors (Larson, 1961; Rutledge, 1977-78; 
Peck, 1982) suggest alternatives to treat with these positions. Nevertheless, Sanders et al 
(2010) decided to allocate non-reportable positions to the reportable one, maintaining the 
reportable weighs. However, the authors neglect the spreading positions. In this paper, it is 
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argued that ignoring spreading positions may not be accurate and it is proposed a new 
approach to include them while allocating non-reportable positions. The method will be 
explored later when analyzing non-reportable weaknesses specifically. In practical terms, 
this may be a detail and it remains rather unnoted. Nevertheless, it introduces further 
consistency to the analysis in its complex. 
The second main weakness of Working’s (1960) methodology concerns the usage of the 
CIT report. In Working’s (1960) Speculative Index is not possible to analyze separately the 
role of noncommercial and index traders. Hence, Sanders et al (2010) consider speculators 
as the sum of noncommercial and index traders. While this approach evaluates the 
importance of financial investors it does not focus specifically on index traders. 
Considering the evident shortcomings therein, this paper will adopt a different method. 
While it will still use Working’s (1960) methodology and the data provided by CIT report, 
the traders’ categories will be rearranged to compute a Speculative Index centered on Index 
Traders. Based on several works conclusions works (Larson, 1961; Working 1960 and 
CFTC, 2008), it will combine commercial and noncommercial positions, and will consider 
index traders alone as speculators. This is expected to be the most important contribution 
that this paper will attempt to make to the subject. 
 
The results of Speculative Index between 2006 and April 2012 illustrated by each of the 
two approaches are comparable and in line with previous works (Working, 1960; Larson, 
1961; Rutledge, 1977-78). This suggests that the amount of speculation did not increase 
from previous decades despite the fact that the financial market changed considerably. 
Under the first approach, Speculative Index ranged at relatively higher levels than in the 
second one as it considers speculators noncommercial and index traders. Nevertheless, 
although the two Working’s T are above 1, the desirable level when there is no speculation, 
it may not be sufficient to suggest an excess of speculation in agricultural derivative 
markets. Indeed, an excess of speculators may be needed. This is an idea already defended 
by Working (1960), although he had not proposed a maximum limit to it. Nevertheless, the 
Speculative Index may only range significantly high on the wheat traded in the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBT) market. This may suggest that participation of index traders may 
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only be excessive in that context. 
 
 
The second chapter reviews the current food crisis and the food price evolution. It 
enumerates the factors that contribute to food price formation and explains the main 
characteristics of future agricultural commodity markets. The third chapter contrasts the 
authors that advocate a negative and a positive role of speculation, and particularly of index 
traders in agricultural derivative markets. It also resumes the investigation question which 
concerns the role of index traders on agricultural commodities. In Chapter four a 
comparison will be made between the different reports that publish weekly data about 
traders’ positions on agricultural commodity markets, making the case for the choice 
adopted to use Supplemental Commodity Index (CIT). In the fifth chapter, the author 
presents the methodology to be used and discusses its main weaknesses. Still in the same 
chapter are proposed different approaches to solve it. Finally, in the sixth and last chapter, 
Working’s methodology is applied to two different approaches. First, it will update the 
work of Sanders et al (2010) to 2006 and April 2012 period. It will then present a new 
approach in order to focus on the importance of index traders in agricultural commodities, 
regarding the participation of other traders.  
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2. Agricultural Commodities 
In the last years, agricultural commodity prices increased. It is forecasted that they may 
persist high in the long term. However, this may have serious social repercussions, mainly 
on poor developing countries. Food price increases will likely aggravate the hunger 
situation and will compromise its eradication. Price soaring in food staples is explained by 
different supply and demand elements that contribute to agricultural commodity prices 
formation. Between those factors, speculation deserves special attention. In fact, 
speculation impacts the price of agricultural commodities since those products are traded 
on derivative markets, where not only hedgers but also financial investors negotiate. 
Recently, commodity index has become the derivative instrument which has sparked a 
growing interest due to its characteristics. 
2.1. Food Prices Evolution 
In recent decades food prices have shown unstable behavior. Food prices peaked in 1980, 
1983, 1988, 1996, 2001, 2006, and again in 2008. According to Mittal (2009), staple 
commodity prices grew 83 percent between 2005 and 2008 and despite a smooth decline at 
the end of 2008. The prices still remained high. From October 2010 to January 2011 the 
food price indices showed an increase of 15 percent (World Bank, 2011b). For this reason, 
FAO considered this as a permanent occurrence.  
In 2008, grain commodities registered the highest price in the basket of agricultural 
commodities while in 2010 sugar prices increased considerably (Chart 1). Additionally, 
since 2000, all price increases have been accompanied by a rise in volatility, which became 
more pronounced since 2006 (FAO et al., 2011).  
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Charter 1 – Food commodity price indices (2002-2004=100) 
 
Source: FAO, [Online], Available: http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-
home/foodpricesindex/en/, (Accessed: 11
th
 October 2011) 
 
In agricultural markets, volatility may be perceived as a negative event. There is a source of 
concern when price changes are abrupt and cannot be anticipated. Sharp variations may 
convey a misleading message to the market, causing risky investments and wrong policy 
decisions (FAO et al., 2011). There may be several reasons to help explain such price 
variations. Characteristics inherent to agriculture play an important role. A crop depends on 
weather conditions and has long production periods, events which complicate the short-
term meet between supply and demand, causing harsh price adjustment (FAO et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, there are other aspects that interfere and spread those variations. According to 
the IFAD (2011), price fluctuations will most likely persist in the long-term. 
 
However, price increases do not affect all countries equally. There may be differences 
between international and local commodity prices. The gap would depend on the 
integration level and structure of national markets. Restrictive policies and weak 
infrastructures, such as transports and lines of communication, tend to perpetuate the 
discrepancy between domestic and international agricultural commodity prices 
(Rapsomanikis, 2011; FAO et al. 2011). 
The unexpected soaring of prices, and their volatility, have important social repercussions. 
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In the poorest developing countries, between 60 to 80 percent of families’ income is spent 
on food expenditures (Mittal, 2010; Schutter 2010) as opposed to 20 percent in developed 
countries (Wahl, 2009). The major concern of price increases may be the negative impact 
on the purchasing power of the population. This leads to a reduction in the number of daily 
meals or/and an intake of less nutritious food. Simultaneously, health and education are 
overlooked and families seek new sources of income; which generally leads to child labor 
exploitation (Prakash, 2011). In this context, price increases are perceived as a threat to 
food security (Ghosh, 2010; Wahl, 2009) and to the satisfaction of basic needs. They may 
well compromise the sustainability of future generations and countries’ development. In 
2011, the World Bank (2011b) warned that continuous price increases would send an 
additional 44 million people into extreme poverty. 
In 2010, there were 926 million undernourished individuals around the world mainly 
concentrated (98 percent) in developing countries. The Asia Pacific and sub-Saharan 
Regions are the most affected, having 62 percent and 26 percent of the total undernourished 
population, respectively (FAO 2010 b). However, the number of hungry people in the total 
continent’s population is higher in Africa region than in Asia Pacific.  
 
Figure 1 – Hunger map in 2010, by region in millions 
Source –FAO, 2010 b 
 
Hunger is a major obstacle to the world’s development and should preferably be treated 
globally. For this reason, the fight against hunger was included, together with poverty 
Latin America and Caribbean 
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North of Africa and 
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 239 
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eradication, in the first of the eight Millennium Development Goals set by the United 
Nations in the year 2000. This objective is important for the achievement of the other, 
mainly those concerning health and education (UNDG I, 2010). One of the goals consisted 
in the undernourished population to drop to 10 percent by the year 2015. Although the year 
2010 was the first in fifteen to see a decrease in the absolute numbers of undernourished 
people, FAO (2010b) projected that still in 2010 16 percent of the world’s population did 
not have access to safe and nutritious food.  
 
Consequently, among all purposed goals, the fight against hunger goal presents the worse 
performance and its implementation is unlikely to be achieved. As a result, the food crisis is 
already indicated as a structural problem and needs to be solved quickly to enable a global 
sustainable growth. In 2011, the president of the World Bank group reiterated the 
importance of fighting hunger and the weight that a price increase has in the problem’s 
exacerbation: “Today too many people are living on the edge – the victims of rising and 
volatile food prices. (…) There is no silver bullet to resolving the potent combination of 
rising and volatile food prices. But food security is now a global security issue. We need 
global action to ensure we do a better job of feeding the hungry before we face the future 
challenges of feeding the expected nine billion people in the world in 2050.”1 
By 2050, as a result of demographic and economic growth, international agencies expect an 
increase of 70 to 100 percent on food demand (FAO et al., 2011). If supplies do not grow 
simultaneously, staple food prices will continue to rise.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
World Bank (2011a), “The World Bank, Opening Remarks on Food Prices/Pre-G-20”, 2011  
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2.2. Factors that contribute to price formation 
Agricultural commodities
2
 are not exclusively intended to human consumption. Staple food 
have three main destinations on a daily basis: human consumption (grain, soft and livestock 
commodities), animal consumption (grain commodities) and energy production (soft and 
grain commodities). These three players – human, animal and energy needs - compete with 
each other for a limited amounts of agricultural commodities. Moreover, staple foods have 
not only pronounced inelasticity due to the existence of few substitutable goods, the long 
times in production and the structural pattern of consumption but also high levels of 
unpredictability, particularly due to the dependence on weather conditions (Turner et. al, 
2011).  
In this context, whether supply or demand elements are limiting the equilibrium remains 
difficult to assess. While the demand for food is established yearly, supply depends on two 
factors: (1) yearly production and (2) surplus from previous years known as stocks (Geman, 
2005). This imbalance may be the result of simultaneous occurrences and/or by the 
interaction of diverse facts which together are triggering the actual food crisis and leading 
to further price swings (Wahl, 2009 and Schutter, 2010). 
 
The current situation contributes in making this debate more appellant. In the last three 
years there has been a great deal of literature related to this subject and many authors have 
analyzed the agriculture’s market fundamentals in order to explain the food price 
fluctuations (Ghosh, 2010; Schutter, 2010; Trostle et al. 2011; Fan et al. 2010; Wahl, 2009; 
Mittal, 2009; Abbott et al.. 2011; FAO, 2008). Table 1 summarizes the various explanatory 
factors presented by different authors. The contribution of each element to the price 
increase varies in time and across commodities.  
 
                                                          
2
 The connotation of agricultural commodity may have a narrow or fuller meaning. It may just identify 
agriculture products excluding the cattle or, it may classify the entire agricultural sector. In this study, the 
expression agricultural commodity is used in its wider sense. 
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Table 1 – Factors that drive the food prices 
 
2.2.1. Climate changes 
Climate changes directly impact agriculture production and it is one of the factors that 
enhances supply’s inelasticity (EUCommission, 2008). Adverse weather conditions, as 
floods and droughts, compromise the harvests (Schutter, 2010; Ghosh, 2010). The impact 
of bad harvests will be greater the lower the stock levels are (Trostle et al. 2011). 
Moreover, bad harvests impose a supply side constrain which generates an increase in 
prices. During the last two price risings to date, unfavorable weather conditions took place 
in Russia, Australia, Black Sea Region and Canada which are important food producing 
regions. (Wahl, 2009; Mittal, 2009; Abbott et al., 2011). Additionally, experts argue that 
natural disasters have been increasing in recent years and are expected to deteriorate further 
(World Food Programme, 2009). 
2.2.2. Agriculture productivity  
In order to address an increasing demand, food production would desirably rise in 
proportion. Yet, in recent decades there has been a decline in agricultural productivity 
(Mittal, 2009). According to the World Bank, the total available land for cultivation has 
been stable for the last five decades. This corroborates the fact that agriculture production 
did not follow the population growth, causing more pressure on the demand side. The cause 
is attributed to several factors such as soil depletion and reduction of public and private 
investment. Moreover, FAO (2008) considers the decline in agricultural productivity the 
Change on dietary pattern
Urban population increase
Legend: Short - Term
Oil Prices
Trade Policies - export restrictions
Supply Factors
Climatic Changes
Decline of agricultural productivity
Scarcity of natural resources
Agricultural disinvestment
Stock decline
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Trade Policies - "panic buying"
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most important source of food price increases. 
2.2.3. Natural Resources 
The scarcity of natural resources is an additional constrain on the supply side. The shortage 
of water not only allows a faster spreading of fungus and illness, it also contributes to 
production delocalization, as well as decreasing land’s productivity (EU Commission, 
2008). Soil depletion causes crop stagnation and new arable land tends to have lower 
profitability than land already under cultivation (Ghosh, 2010 and Abbott et al. 2011). In 
order to feed the world population in the coming years, it is estimated that agriculture 
production needs to rise at least 80 percent.  
Nevertheless, Abbott et al. (2011) refers that there is sufficient fertile land to increase crop 
production and soaring food prices may be a good incentive to induce it. Geman (2005) 
also points out that once this uncultivated land starts to produce supply will likely meet 
demand requirements (Geman, 2005).  
2.2.4. Investment 
Agriculture investments have not been sufficient to cover the growth in demand (Wahl, 
2009). Subsidies and governmental funds tend to go to the most populated regions. 
Therefore, the incentives rather than promoting agriculture are being allocated to urban 
agglomerates (EU Commission, 2008). Currently, in the sub-Saharan Region only 4 percent 
of public budget is allocated to agriculture, even though, in 2003 the African Union 
established a minimum contribution of 10 percent of GDP to the agriculture sector.  
FAO et al. (2011) state that agriculture investment has to be quickly addressed since it is 
the main source of sustainable growth and food security. 
2.2.5. Stocks  
Stocks are the main buffer to supply shocks. Likewise, a decline on inventories is another 
factor that may limit the capability to adjust. Although it is difficult to accurately measure 
world stock levels (Turner et. al, 2011), there has been a stock depletion in recent years 
12 
 
(Abbott et al., 2011). The high cost of stocking perishable products and the trend of low 
food prices were the main reasons to reduce the storage of agricultural commodities (EU 
Commission, 2008). Equally important was the widespread use of the “just in time” model 
which had caused the diminishing of stock’s level. Indeed this fact in the greatest need 
areas had lowered the capacity to face urgent situations (Mittal, 2009). In addition, 
according to Geman (2005) high prices tend to occur on low stocks periods which further 
harmful the ability to respond to poor populations.  
2.2.6. Oil price 
Due to its wide uses, oil is of great importance for several economic activities and has 
become an indispensable commodity (Turner et. al 2011). Oil has played a major role in the 
food crisis, influencing the agricultural commodity prices, directly and indirectly (Ghosh, 
2010 and Wahl, 2009).  
The direct impact of oil price in agricultural commodities occurs through input costs such 
as fertilizers or transportation. The transmission mechanism, resulting from the strong 
dependence of oil on commodity’s production, suggests that food prices react to every oil 
price variation, either caused by supply and demand elements or by speculation. 
Nevertheless, some authors advocate that speculation on oil is a temporary factor resulting 
on a soften impact (Trostle et. al, 2011). In 2008 the oil prices reached new high levels, 
falling immediately after. However, this was not a sustainable decline since prices rose 
again by the end of 2009. Food prices accompanied both increases.  
On the other hand, the indirect impact of oil prices is disseminated through substitutable 
goods. High oil prices encourage agents to seek out alternative energy solutions (Trostle et. 
al, 2011). 
2.2.7. Biofuel 
In order to stimulate the renewable energies and to reduce oil dependence, increased 
subsidies are being given to ethanol and biofuel production (Mittal, 2009). In fact, the 
European Commission has purposed a specific target: achieve 10% of biofuel usage by 
2020. (IEA, 2007).  
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Based on the incentives, the production of these energies boosted sharply
3
 pushing 
agricultural demand and prices up. The most common commodities used to produce 
biodiesel are soybeans, sugar and corn (Mittal, 2009 and Trostle et. al, 2011). Currently 30 
percent of corn, 20 percent of sugar cane, 9 percent of vegetable oil and 4 percent of sugar 
beet production are destined to ethanol production (FAO et al., 2011 and The World Bank, 
2011b). The strong demand for biofuel in addition to the increase in commodity prices and 
the decrease in the amount of products available for human consumption, promotes a direct 
competition for arable land (Mittal, 2009 and Wahl, 2009). According to Abbott et al. 
(2011), even if public grants diminish, the commodities demand for bio-energy will last as 
long as the oil price remains at high levels.  
Lastly, the growing importance of biofuel is also promoting financial interest on grains 
commodities, which will be an additional source of speculation driving into cereal 
commodity prices. 
2.2.8. The US dollar 
Most commodities are denominated in US dollars (USD). Fan and Headey (2010) refer that 
normally, every dollar devaluation (appreciation) results on commodities price increase 
(decrease). An illustrative example of this dynamic can be made by looking at 1974 and 
again 2008. Trostle et al (2010) further suggest that the depreciation of the USD 
devaluation is a long-term factor which will persist through the coming decades. In this 
context, countries that are net commodity importers and do not have their currency pegged 
to the USD, will initially witness a decrease on their import costs. Still, this may just be a 
temporary effect since lower import costs result on increasing demand pressure which will 
end up inflating commodity prices.  
This notwithstanding, the USD devaluation would create most difficulties to net importing 
developing countries that have their currency pegged to the USD. Such countries would in 
fact unable to benefit from a currency movement, even in an initial period. Central 
American region may be the most affected by dollar depreciation. 
                                                          
3
 The Evolution of Biodiesel Gross Production (1000 Metric tons), UNDATA, in Appendix 1 
14 
 
2.2.9. Trade Policies 
Food prices may also be influenced by governments through their public policies. Those 
interventions will though depend on the impact price increases have on their countries. In 
times of excess demand, food producing countries will likely implement restrictive trade 
policies (limiting exports) in order to avoid food scarcity and guarantee food staples to their 
population (Mittal, 2009). As a result, agriculture products are retained locally and fewer 
commodities reach international markets. One the one hand, this decision while is 
protecting a specific domestic market, it may be promoting an international supply shock 
and pressuring prices up (EU Commission, 2008 and Wahl, 2009). On the other hand, it 
may also harm small domestic farmers. These producers will not incorporate the price raise 
and will be discouraged to further increase their production in the following years. 
Consequently, this protectionism resolution may contribute to shrink food supply in the 
upcoming years.  
Still, food importing countries will adopt expansive reforms. When prices increase, net 
importing countries will likely anticipate their buying in order to avoid future soars, an 
occurrence also known as panic buying (Trostle et. al, 2011).  
 
Simultaneously, there are other trade measures implemented by governments that may 
negatively impact the short-term equilibrium of certain commodities. Despite the 
international trade recommendations, some countries are subsidizing their agriculture. This 
dumping behavior promotes a false competition over the agricultural markets with diverse 
and serious costs (Mittal, 2009). Developing country farmers may not able to drain their 
agriculture production, mostly monoculture, which consequently stimulates them to look 
for more profitable economic activities. According to the IFAD (2011) in regions where 
hunger is more prevalent, the local farmers are responsible for supplying almost 80 percent 
of consumed food commodities. Therefore, an agriculture abandon may possibly result on 
the diminishing capacity to be auto-sufficient, aggravating the imports’ dependence and 
food insecurity (Mittal, 2009).  
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2.2.10. Demographic factors 
Although the demographic growth rate has been slowing down, there are more people on 
earth today than ever before. According to UN estimations, the world population reached 7 
billion in 2011 
4
 (). As the population grows, so does the demand for food, which may 
further threaten the world’s food equilibrium (EU Commission, 2008). 
Additionally, there are other demographic changes occurring in parallel (EU Commission, 
2008). The majority of the world population is no longer living in rural areas. Nowadays 
almost 51 percent of the total population is concentrated in urban agglomerates (DESA, 
2012). This migration may jeopardize the population ability to feed themselves and may 
cause upward pressure on food demand (IFAD, 2012). This pattern shows a stable tendency 
that is expected to continue in the upcoming decades. Once population is rising, the 
analysis in absolute numbers would be even clearer.  
2.2.11. Economic factors 
Simultaneously, the world economy has been increasing, although growth rates would 
differ from country to country, and income per capita shows a steady trend of growth. 
According to Wahl (2009), this fact will persist in the long term and may result on further 
price increases. Additionally, as purchasing power rises, the demand for more nutritive and 
higher quality food, which are on average more expensive, increase in proportion (Mittal, 
2009; Trostle et al., 2011). Worldwide meat and dairy products are being more consumed. 
This dietary change also affects the demand for grain to feed the stock, pushing cereal 
prices further up (Schutter, 2010). 
2.2.12. Speculation 
In order to help eliminating the natural agriculture unpredictability, some agricultural 
commodities are traded in financial markets. Those markets play the crucial role in terms of 
(1) price discovery, (2) risk transference and (3) liquidity providers (FAO et al., 2011). 
Therefore, a properly functioning derivative market requires a significant number of 
                                                          
4
 The Evolution of World Population , forecast regarding the World Bank medium fertility variant, DESA 
database in Appendix 2 
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participants. As a result, these markets require the participation of other investors than just 
hedgers. Contrary to commercial agents, noncommercial investors trade staple commodities 
for the sole purpose of profiting. These traders aim at taking advantage of market 
opportunities and frequently center their strategy on short periods of time. This is an 
activity known as speculation. 
Speculation may be another explanatory cause of soaring food prices. The EU Commission 
(2008) and Wahl (2009) point out that food basket changes tend to be structural, hence not 
responsible for the current price volatility. While long-term variations are a consequence of 
market fundamentals, short-term cycles are detached from it (Turner et. al, 2011). 
Therefore and despite the growing trend on agricultural prices, there is short term volatility 
on agricultural derivative markets. Among all the determinants presented in Table 1, 
speculation is the one to generate considerable controversy. 
 
Speculation is an activity intended to make profit by taking risks (Hull, 2009). The 
investment rationale of speculators is to maximize the profit by trading variable assets, 
betting on future movements either on the sell or the buy side. In agricultural futures 
markets speculation per se may not exist if not accompanied by hedging transactions 
(Working, 1960). Speculation implies a certain and regular level of variability/market 
fluctuation. As German (2005) states “Liquidity (…) increase(s) in all Futures contracts 
(…). This translates into higher volatility and price risk in all markets5.” 
                                                          
5
 Geman (2005, pp 21-22) 
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2.3.  Future Commodity Markets 
Agricultural commodities that are traded on derivative markets can be categorized in three 
different categories: grain sector (wheat, corn, soybean, oat and rice), soft sector (orange 
juice, sugar, cocoa and cotton) and livestock or cattle sector (feeder cattle, lean hogs, live 
cattle) (Tang and Xiong, 2011).  
 
Investors can trade these products either on exchange-trade markets or over the counter - 
OTC. The differences between these two markets are related to the privacy of negotiation 
and to the participants’ requirements and regulations. Markets of greater relevance are 
located in Chicago, Kansas, London and in Dalian (China). The largest and the most 
important agricultural commodity derivative market is the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) due to its liquidity and the considerable number of products under negotiation. In 
the CME the most traded food commodities are cereals – corn, wheat and soybean – sugar, 
cocoa and cattle.  
Since 2008, the Dalian Commodity Exchange has become the second most active market 
for agricultural derivative trading (Hull, 2009), although, the Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
and the Intercontinental Exchange, former New York Cotton Exchange, remain among the 
largest commodity future exchanges.  
 
Nevertheless, the negotiation in OTC markets has also been increasing (Schutter, 2010). 
Due to the lack of statistics on the OTC market and its traded assets, there is an added 
difficulty in the analysis of agricultural prices and speculation (Wahl, 2009). 
 
Today, the future commodity markets are assuming growing importance, attacking more 
traders and becoming more liquid. Although, oil and energy have a leading position on total 
traded commodities, agriculture products have also increased their trading volumes. 
Consequently, the financial instruments through which agricultural commodities can be 
negotiated have been more complex and diverse. Currently, agriculture products may be 
traded through: commodity futures and options and commodity index future and options 
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(e.g. Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index
SM
) or ETF (e.g. ETFS Agriculture DJ – UBSCISM 
) (EU Commission, 2008). 
Over all, index and ETF have sparked a growing interest once they allow investors to take 
advantage of price movements without having to negotiate commodities directly (Irwin et 
al., 2010). On the one hand, direct negotiation is sometimes prohibited to certain investors, 
whilst on the other investments through structured instruments are less costly and allow a 
lower risk exposure (Irwin et al., 2010; Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele, 2010). In the 
Policy Brief 9, the FAO points out that index investors hold between 25 and 35 percent of 
future contracts on agricultural commodities (FAO, 2010 a). 
 
The most important indices incorporating agricultural commodities are the S&P GSCI and 
the DJ UBS CI, the composition of which at 31
st
 October 2011 are illustrated on Table 2 
below. Agricultural commodities are generally included on indices that are also composed 
by energy and metal commodities. Frequently, agricultural commodities do not have a 
significant share in such indices and energy commodities tend to lead the basket. 
Nevertheless, the total volume of corn traded in agricultural futures markets exceeds the 
volume of any metal or precious metal commodity as copper or gold. By the end of 2011, 
more than 1.5 million of corn open positions where negotiated on the Chicago Board of 
Trade.  
 
Table 2 – S&P GSCI dollar weights and DJ UBS sector weightings at 31st October 
2011 
 
Source – S&P GSCI [Online],  and Dow Jones – UBS Commodity Index, [Online] 
Investors trading agricultural commodity derivatives may be divided into two different 
Commodity S&P - GSCI DJ - UBS
Energy 69,5% 34,0%
Agriculture 15,0% 27,6%
Precious Metals 7,0% 17,2%
Industrial Metals 4,6% 15,2%
Livestock 3,9% 6,0%
19 
 
segments: commercial and noncommercial. Hedgers, commercial or traditional investors 
are those who regularly use derivate markets to hedge their physical positions. On the 
contrary, agents that are engaged in gaining exposure to risk and trying to maximize their 
returns by playing with price fluctuation, are called speculators, financial or noncommercial 
investors (Masters and White, 2008). According to Johnson (1960) and following Keynes 
theory “hedgers are willing to pay a risk premium to relieve themselves of price risk, while 
speculators are willing to enter the future markets only if they have the expectation of 
collecting a premium.” In order to be a counterpart to hedgers’ positions, the intervention 
of financial agents is compulsory. On general, and for a long time now, hedgers have been 
mainly net short, requiring financial investors to hold net long positions (Working, 1960).  
 
Noncommercial classification may be too broad and further distinctions are made. Hull 
(2009) presents a third trader classification: the arbitrageurs. Their strategy is to profit with 
instantaneous market abnormalities. In order to pursue their tactic, arbitrageurs operate 
simultaneously in several markets and are focused on very short-time investments. As a 
result, it is too difficult to detect their present and perceive their importance.  
This notwithstanding, the remaining financial traders can still be differentiated. Regulators 
try to separate them according to their strategies. According to the CFTC (2006) (the 
American derivative regulator entity) it was necessary to introduce index traders category 
and to differentiate them from noncommercial traders since their investment rational is 
different. “[Index] (…) trading is not based on a view about current or expected individual 
commodity prices (…). Index Traders will mostly be those that are seeking a more general 
exposure to commodity prices, typically in a long-only, unleveraged, and passively-
managed manner using a standardized commodity index.” On the contrary, noncommercial 
traders “(…) may be very responsive to price movements and changing market dynamics.”6 
                                                          
6
 CFTC (2006), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@commitmentsoftraders/documents/file/noticeonsupplementalcotrept
.pdf 
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3. The role of Speculation 
Despite the benefits of trading agricultural commodities on derivative markets, there is an 
intense debate on the role of speculation. This section will present two contradictory 
perspectives. On the one hand, some authors argue that speculation, and specially index 
traders have a negative impact on agricultural futures and they are driving prices up. On the 
contrary, other researches suggests that speculation does not play the main role of the 
current price soaring which is caused for several supply and demand factors. At a later 
stage, it will explore the viewpoint of several regulatory bodies and the most recent 
directions and recommendations published. Lately in this section, it will be suggested 
further investigation, mainly on the role of index traders. The main question to answer 
would be whether index traders’ participation is essential to match commercial positions 
and therefore measuring their importance on agricultural derivative markets. A recent study 
by Sanders et al (2010) explored this topic utilizing 2006-2008 data, and a methodology 
derived by Working (1960) is illustrated below. 
3.1. The negative role of Speculation  
Discussions on food crisis gained a new awareness since speculation has gained visibility 
as a subject matter. As speculators are not interested on holding commodities, they are able 
to freely move between markets searching for the best investments opportunities. However, 
given the ethical and responsible investment issues (EU Commission, 2008 and Kerckhoffs 
and Vander Stichele, 2010), it is important to evaluate whether speculation, and financial 
investments increase, are important contributing factors to price peaks. Some authors 
defend that the overwhelming number of financial investors in agricultural futures markets 
was one of the main causes of price rises in 2008 (Wahl, 2009; Schutter, 2010; Kerckhoffs 
and Vander Stichele, 2010) and again in 2010 (Abbott et. al, 2011). 
Since 2000 there has been a significant increase in the amount of capital and number of 
investors trading in agricultural commodity markets. In particular, there was an increase 
amongst those agents that do not traditionally invest in these assets, such as pension funds, 
investment banks or sovereign funds (Schutter, 2010; Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele, 
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2010). For this reason and in order to summarize the growing participation of financial 
investors in agricultural futures markets the expression financialization of commodities was 
created and gained wide use (Prakash and Gilbert, 2011).  
 
There are various reasons for this growing attractiveness. Some authors (Ghosh 2010; 
Schutter, 2010) suggest the market liberalization, through the US Commodity Future 
Modernization Act of 2000, promulgated by former US president Bill Clinton, encouraged 
financial investments to allow for negotiations without position limits or disclosure 
requirements. Once these commodities were considered a refugee asset and a source of 
higher profits when the other financial assets depreciated, more interest emerged in 
agricultural derivative markets. Indeed in 2001 and again in 2007 the crisis on the 
traditional financial markets stimulated the investments on agricultural commodities (Wahl, 
2009). 
 
Nonetheless, attraction has grown over the inherent characteristics of agriculture products. 
On the one hand, it is a traditional and stable market: demand for food is a necessary 
condition for human life. Yet on the other hand, the agricultural commodity market is 
uncorrelated with traditional financial assets – bonds and stocks, and it is therefore a 
vehicle to diversify investment portfolios (Schutter, 2010; FAO, 2010a; Trostle et al., 
2011). In fact, The Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index
SM
 Handbook clearly underlines “the 
principal potential benefits of including commodities in a diversified financial portfolio 
include: positive returns over time [and] low correlation with stocks and bonds” (DJ-UBS 
CI
SM
, 2012).  
 
Some authors noted that the massive influx of money into agricultural commodity 
derivative markets created an inflationary pressure on prices. Some add that, there is an 
extra pressure on price increases since index traders mainly hold long-only positions 
(Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele, 2010).  
The expectancy of a price rise in the future may be sufficient to generate a bubble event. 
Indeed, bubble defenders argue that the flow of money into derivative agricultural 
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commodities lead the market to a contango situation – fact that occurs when future prices 
are higher than the expected cash prices, for the same underlying asset (Schutter, 2010).  
In this context, the major concern is the creation of a vicious circle. When sellers realize the 
upward trend of prices, they postpone sales to achieve higher returns. On the contrary, 
buyers anticipate purchase in order to avoid even higher prices in the future. In the end, 
those behaviors will further exacerbate the crisis. Wahl (2009) states that agricultural 
commodities are subject to speculation and may for this reason create a commodity bubble. 
 
Likewise, Schutter (2010) argues that this speculation may amplify changes happening on 
market fundamentals or use them as catalyst. He notes that financial investors enter the 
market only when they anticipate profit opportunities, but their long term strategies may 
not be detached from economic considerations either. Market fundamentals may in fact 
justify and stimulate speculators financial investments.  
 
Nevertheless, the inelasticity of agricultural commodities causes, supply and demand 
factors alone to be neither sufficient to explain the continuously price increases nor the 
volatility during 2008. There are other events that had little to do with the agricultural 
commodity markets but ended up affecting it. Indeed, the prices fall in mid-2008 may be 
explained by financial investors’ behavior. With the devaluation of traditional financial 
markets, the funds required liquidity. They managed to achieve it through the liquidation of 
their positions in commodity markets (Ghosh, 2010). The attraction is based on financial 
factors, rather than related to supply and demand features (Masters and White, 2008). Some 
authors even suggest that the higher the market volatility, the greater the investors’ interest 
(Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele, 2010). All these are additional arguments submitted to 
restrict the participation of speculators on agricultural commodity future markets. 
 
Adopting, different perspective, Masters and White (2008) suggest that index investors are 
also major contributors to the gap between prices and economic fundamentals. The authors 
based their analysis on the fact that prices of all assets belonging to S&P GSCI and DJ-
UBS indices had risen. In addition, Ray and Schaffer (2011) refer that rather than a single 
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investment, prices on future markets would only be affected by a strong volume of 
investments. Likewise, Keckhoffs and Vander Stichele (2010) and Tang and Xiong (2011) 
note that index composition requirements easily explain it.  
An index is a basket of commodities where each commodity has a specific weight, usually 
according to its economic value. In general, agricultural commodities integrate, as a minor 
fraction, index funds that are mainly composed by energy commodities, such as oil. The 
weight of each commodity in the index fund is previously defined and cannot vary much. 
For example the DJ-UBS CI 
SM
 (2012) imposes that “no single commodity (e.g., natural gas 
or silver) may constitute over 15% of the Index. No single commodity, together with its 
derivatives (e.g., crude oil, together with heating oil and unleaded gas), may constitute 
more than 25% of the Index. No related group of commodities (e.g., energy, precious 
metals, livestock or grains) may constitute more than 33% of the Index. No single 
commodity (e.g., natural gas or silver) may constitute less than 2% of the Index.” These 
rules must be complied at any given moment. Therefore, when a single commodity 
appreciates, it will exceed its established weight and there will be a deviation from the 
optimal portfolio composition. In order to rebalance the index, there will be a position’s 
reinforcement on the remaining commodities. This process is made through additional 
purchases on derivate markets. As a result, the price of those commodities, rather than 
being impacted by its market fundamentals, may change due to this index investment 
mechanism. The higher the volume of this process is, the higher price impact it will 
generate.  
Ray and Shalfer (2010) suggest that such an event may have occurred during 2008 when oil 
price boosted. There, the index funds rebalance process may have promoted the agricultural 
commodity prices increase. Such occurrences help corroborate the argument that index 
strategy becomes insensitive to prices and managers invest in the assets disregarding its 
costs (Masters and White, 2008). 
 
More to this argument, Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele (2010) state that, the fact that index 
investors mostly take long-only positions may be another obstacle to a properly-functioning 
market. Additionally, Masters and White (2008) suggest that being mostly long, in an 
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extreme long term analysis index traders may consume liquidity rather providing liquidity 
to the derivative markets. This causes a distortion on their primarily function on derivative 
markets. 
 
3.2. The positive role of Speculation 
Unlike the previously cited studies, other authors refute the idea that speculation is the main 
component forcing prices up. These researchers argue that there are net benefit effects from 
having financial investors trading on agricultural markets. In fact, not only those investors 
serve as greater liquidity agents but also function as a stabilizing mechanism, allowing for 
price discovery rather than price distortion (Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele, 2010; FAO, 
2010 a).  
 
Irwin and Sanders (2010) emphasize that there is no evidence of a negative casual relation 
between commodity future prices and index funds positions (Irwin and Sanders, 2010), 
meaning that commodity prices are not rising when index funds investments rise. This 
finding is confirmed when looking at similar price increases on index and non-index 
commodities (Irwin and Sanders, 2010). In addition, Stoll and Whaley (2010) were able to 
refute the idea that the rapid growth of index investments was reducing future markets’ 
efficiency. In fact, after different tests, the authors were not able to statistically identify any 
significant difference on price movements between: (1) index commodity and non-index 
commodity, and (2) commodities traded on future markets and commodities that are not 
traded or without relevance on those markets. Granger causality test and contemporaneous 
relation evaluation fail to identify net correlation between commodity index investors and 
future returns (Stoll and Whaley, 2010). 
 
This topic is being discussed within non-academic contexts as well. International 
organizations that are highly concerned about the food crisis study and publish research 
works on the topic. FAO regularly measures the average level of food index prices. And in 
fact, FAO does not consider speculation as an initial source of price increases. This idea is 
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sustained over a number of articles published by this organization. Despite indicating 
empirical studies supporting both factions, FAO argues that it would not be feasible to 
conclude that speculation would be a key factor in price rises. This statement is bolstered 
by the fact that some assets with high volatility, as rice, are not relevant on future markets. 
FAO (2010) further notes that strong demand in derivate markets can be satisfied by 
issuing new contracts, which do not cause significant price changes. The organization may 
regard speculation as a cause of staple food price swings, but only in the short-term (FAO, 
2010) since the long term equilibrium is established by supply and demand elements, which 
according to FAO blurs speculation importance. 
 
Also Bos and Molen (2012) found evidence supporting such statements particularly in 
coffee, where while index traders may generate a small level of inefficiency, in most cases 
market fundamentals are sufficient conditions to explain variations in coffee price. 
Indeed, several investment banks use economic arguments (demand and supply) to promote 
and to support predictable future valorizations on products that include agricultural 
commodities. As an example, CRB Global Agriculture Equity Index (2011) highlighted 
that its investment rational on agricultural commodities was linked to the agriculture 
demand and supply factors as resumed in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 – Features and Benefits on Thomson Reuters/Jefferies CRB In-the- round 
Global Agriculture Equity Index (CRBAX) October 2011 
Features Benefits
Inelastic Demand With world population expected to grow by approximately 1 
billion people by 2020, demand for food will rise 
accordingly.
Improving Diets Rising meat consumption in certain markets – China in 
particular – results in a disproportionate rise in demand for 
grains (approximately 7 lbs. of vegetable protein required to 
produce 1 lb. of animal protein)
Sector Emphasis Over 57% of the CRBAX comprises producers of seeds, 
traits, chemicals and fertilizers, which are the primary 
feedstock of all agricultural commodities and the common 
denominator for nearly all agricultural products.
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Source –CRBAX, [Online], Available : http://www.crbequityindexes.com/pdf/CRBAX-
Presentation.pdf, (Accessed : 20th October, 2011) 
 
Additionally, conflicting factors are mentioned to further disassemble the negative role of 
speculation. Firstly, financial investors are neither interested in physically detaining nor 
storing commodities. If there was a bubble, large agricultural commodities would be stored 
in order to sell it later at a higher price. However, there was no evidence of inventories 
increase. Further, the convergence between future and cash prices arises near the close of 
the contract. As a result, speculators may only impact cash prices if they hold the contracts 
until the delivery (Irwin et al., 2009). There is evidence that just about 1% of physical 
contracts is delivered at maturity (Geman, 2005). Since it is the physical delivery that 
promotes the convergence, speculators are not able to distort prices.  
Nevertheless, there are some factors that may lead to a lack of convergence, such as 
transaction costs and market congestion. Noting that the rolling over of index positions 
occur within a narrow period, Irwin, Garcia, Good and Kunda (2011) conducted a research 
relating these events to commodity prices. They concluded that the lack of convergence had 
occurred even before the index investors heavily traded in the agricultural commodity 
future markets. This result may confirm that speculators did not increase cash prices; 
neither did they contribute to the deterioration of the pricing system (Irwin et al., 2011).  
It should be underscored here that, future markets are a zero sum game. Each long position 
is matched by a short one. Since speculators mainly hold long-only positions, they would 
not be negotiating if there was not another interested counterpart. Other category of 
investors must exist to offset speculators’ contracts. Sanders et al (2010) concluded that 
while index traders are net long, commercial traders are between 20% and 65% net short. 
 
Moreover, index investors may only be considered excessive when compared with other 
investors. According to Sanders et al. (2010), the increase of index positions are in line 
with the contracts’ increase held by other investors (commercial and noncommercial). The 
index boom in commodity future markets may, as a result, be beneficial once it offers the 
opportunity to commercial investors offset their open interest.  
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3.3. Suggestions and Reforms 
According to this array of diverse positions, the solution to avoid price swings offers little 
agreement. According to Bos and Molen (2012) the debate peaked in the summer of 2010, 
when two authors (Irwins and Masters) presented contradicted arguments on the role of 
speculation on commodity prices. However, Masters’ version may have prevailed. Masters 
(2008) who corroborates the existence of a bubble hypothesis, defends greater government 
intervention and the application of stricter standards for financial investors (Schutter, 2010 
and Ghosh, 2010). Under this context, it is observed the implementation of a more 
demanding regulation. In July 2010, in the United States of America, the Dodd-Frank 
Wall-Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act law was enacted, aiming to regulate the 
OTC contracts (Chapter VII). Likewise, the European Union Commission has been 
adopting new rules on derivative markets and OTC contracts, to achieve greater 
transparency and stability in the financial system (EU Commission, 2008).  
 
Contrarily, the proponents of the non-bubble’s existence have warned that stronger 
regulation may be an obstacle to well-functioning markets and could lead to capital 
migration (Suppan, 2010). According to the CME, it is increasing the amount of 
agricultural derivative contracts traded outside the US. The FAO (2008) also notes that the 
importance given to speculation diverts attention from the agriculture disinvestment, which 
is, according to this institution the key factor to price rises. 
3.4. Evaluate the role of index traders in agricultural commodities 
After contrasting perspectives and in spite of the implemented rules, financial investors 
continue to play a major role in agricultural futures markets. Therefore, the debate on 
speculation is not yet finished. On the one hand, there are still some topics that can be 
reviewed or further explored. On the other hand, several distinct analyses were conducted 
with data incorrectly classified which could have contaminated the conclusions. This paper 
will pursue the current debate by investigating whether the focus on speculators and 
particularly on index traders is reasonable.  
The main question is whether index traders’ positions are driving food prices up. In fact, 
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index traders hold net long positions (Sanders et al., 2010) and long positions may exert an 
inflationary pressure on prices. Still this evidence is not sufficient to consider index traders 
as the main responsible for the agricultural price boom. It is important to recall that future 
markets are zero sum games, meaning that any long position has a counterparty given by a 
short position. So, counterbalances speculators’? This work will attempt to answer this 
central question. If index traders are offsetting commercial positions then there is no 
evidence to argue that they are forcing prices up. They provide market liquidity and allow 
hedgers to transfer their risks. If this is the case, there will be an open question regarding 
the causes of those price rises. On the contrary, if index traders would be matching other 
financial positions, it would be feasible not only to advocate that agricultural futures 
markets would be far from being hedging markets, but indeed to defend further restrictions 
to those participations.  
This has been a recurrent studying topic particularly since agricultural commodities are 
negotiated on financial markets. In fact, there are several works that address these questions 
but they are neither actual nor using the correct data. One of the most recent studies was 
published by Sanders et al. (2010) in 2010. The authors concluded that even if index traders 
played a significant role on long positions, their relative importance has been stable over 
the years. Sanders et al. (2010a) further suggest that index traders’ make a valuable 
contribution to future markets by providing liquidity and allowing the match of short 
positions. Yet using the best available data, this research work had only analyzed a short 
period of time (2006-2008). Therefore, there is an opportunity to update the results to an 
extended period, following Sanders et al. (2009) methodology. In addition, and since 2008 
was a significant volatile year on agricultural commodity markets, the former study may 
reveal distorting conclusion. It follows that a larger research period will help blurring 
2008’s importance and possibly suggesting different findings.  
In sum, this work will evaluate whether index traders participations are currently causing 
market distortions or rather serving hedgers purposes. Despite the analysis may not answer 
to all these questions, it may provide a guide to understand the traders’ relationships and to 
further investigate new topics. 
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4. Data analysis of the CFTC reports  
First this section will compare the reports published by CFTC regarding traders’ categories 
and it will highlight index traders’ classification. Subsequently and to give a broad time-
perspective, it will analyze the agricultural derivative commodities since 1995 until 2011, 
using the Commitments of Traders (COT) report. Next it will present main problems in this 
report by comparing it with the most accurate report concerning index traders, the 
Supplemental Commodity Index. Finally, using CIT report data, it will deepen explore the 
role of index traders by analyzing the open interest per category of trader and per 
commodity between 2006 and April 2012.  
 
 
The CFTC regularly publishes several reports that aim to provide complete and full data on 
commodity derivative markets. The first report to be released (COT) only disaggregates the 
investors on commercial and noncommercial traders. Although the amount of open 
positions is not prone to error, there was a growing concern about the feasibility of this data 
classification. The CFTC (2006) stated that after 1990 there was an increase participation of 
financial traders in agricultural futures markets. This fact raised the concern of traders’ 
misclassification and the difficulty of tracking their intention and their impact on 
agricultural markets. 
 
In order to improve the data accuracy, CFTC introduced then new reports that further 
disaggregate the previous classifications. The Disaggregated COT report (“DCOT”) and the 
Supplemental Commodity Index Report (“CIT”) provide weekly data, since 2006, for 12 
agricultural commodities (cocoa, coffee, corn, cotton, feeder cattle, lean hogs, live cattle, 
soybeans, soybean oil, sugar, wheat traded in Chicago Board of Trade [CBT] and wheat 
traded in Kansas City Board of Trade [KZ]) which are trade in different American 
exchange markets. These reports are published every Friday, regarding Tuesday positions.  
Whilst the DCOT report decomposes the reportable investors into new four classes, the CIT 
report adds index traders to the former classifications (Irwin and Sanders, 2011). The 
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connection between these categories is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – Relationships between distinct categories of traders of different CFTC 
reports 
 
Source: Irwin and Sanders, 2011 
 
The need of the CIT report was due to the importance and transaction dimension index 
investors were having in agricultural futures markets. CFTC (2006) refers that the CIT 
report only details agricultural commodities since it is quite easy to understand each 
investor purpose, contrary to metal and energy commodities.  
According to CFTC (2008) definition, index traders “(…) are drawn from both the current 
noncommercial and commercial categories. Coming from the noncommercial category are 
managed funds, pension funds and other institutional investors that generally seek exposure 
to commodity prices as an asset class in an unleveraged and passively managed manner 
using a standardized commodity index. Coming from the commercial category are entities 
whose positions predominantly reflect hedging of OTC transactions involving commodity 
indices (…). The investment objective of a commodity index trader is to track an index of 
commodities over time by acquiring long positions via OTC swap contracts, index funds, or 
exchange-traded futures. The larger commodity index traders typically gain commodity 
exposure through swap dealers.” 
Legacy COT Report Disaggregated COT Report Supplemental CIT Report
Processors & Merchants
Commercials
Non-Reporting Non-Reporting Non-Reporting
Commercials (less index)
Swap Dealers
Non-Commercial (less index)
Managed Money
Non-Commercials Index Traders
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Additionally, in 2007, CFTC started to monthly provide specific and detailed data on index 
investments. The information released on the Index Investment Data (IDD) just comprises 
contracts for “US Futures Markets with greater than 0.5 billion US dollars in reported index 
investment notional value at the end of at least one month (December, March, or June).”7 
However, this report may not be considered since it does not detail index traders’ positions.  
 
Nevertheless, CFTC notes that there are still some minor errors that arise from the current 
classification method. Traders positions are all aggregated according to the traders’ key 
strategy. As a result, investors’ minor activities would be wrongly classified which leads to 
a misunderstanding of each investor interest at any given moment (Irwin et al., 2009 and 
Tang and Xiong, 2011). Moreover, the three reports are weekly published, so arbitrage and 
investments focused on really short periods of time would be difficult to detect (Irwin et al., 
2009). 
But after recognizing that the CFTC’s reports do not provide the optimal accurate data nor 
it perfectly classifies traders, it is still considered to be the best available source of 
information (Stoll and Whaley, 2010). Due to constraints of IID, COT and DCOT reports, 
the data that will be used to study the interactions between the different categories of 
traders, specially focusing on index traders, will be the CIT report. 
4.1. Evolution of future commodity markets 
In order to analyze the open interest on earlier periods, COT data will be used for the same 
12 agricultural commodities. The amount of positions refers to the total amount of contracts 
negotiated on those agricultural futures markets. The size of each contract is similar across 
the different commodities as Appendix 4 shows. Note however that until 1998 the contracts 
of sugar, soybeans, wheat CBT and wheat KZ were smaller and here they were uniformed 
to the current contract size (multiplying by 5) to be comparable. Table 4 and Chart 2 
resume information on open positions between 1995 and 2011. 
                                                          
7
 CFTC (2008) 
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Table 4 – Annual average of COT open interest, COT report between 1995 -2011 
 
Charter 2 – COT open interest, COT report between 1995-2011 
 
Commodity 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cocoa     80.225       92.760     109.086        85.421       83.051     128.573     117.033     124.307     104.853     114.285     139.751        147.588        160.725        159.486        132.317        139.524        191.630   
Coffee     42.448       36.033       47.572        45.250       57.523       59.354       69.738       88.539       95.869     124.839     128.967        144.436        199.206        208.871        152.973        189.864        175.523   
Corn   541.484     516.290     433.417      431.417     462.550     577.551     550.699     612.076     545.915     829.158     880.113     1.580.889     1.790.191     1.892.793     1.286.126     1.774.274     2.053.666   
Cotton   112.423       83.150       99.891      122.926       87.857       87.800       97.046     105.017       82.914       43.007       39.486          92.064        123.674        120.274        184.300        252.421        232.025   Feeder 
Cattle     14.649       23.116       23.713        19.763       20.985       24.282       21.124       16.658       21.913       19.857       29.189          34.471          31.241          33.890          26.436          40.128          44.587   
Lean Hogs             -         12.937       40.809        41.892       57.049       53.211       45.849       37.598       45.595       83.102     108.819        168.579        195.515        239.266        170.644        231.784        283.561   
Live Cattle     72.705     103.225     112.095      113.786     132.033     141.733     136.115     115.686     131.942     130.558     166.684        256.481        274.535        313.297        278.544        406.391        433.170   
Soybeans   197.803     252.636     232.025      199.277     226.574     213.893     211.742     241.776     291.364     327.635     368.079        453.535        668.652        630.191        543.333        679.365        813.925   
Soybean Oil     86.271       99.532     112.672      151.244     171.990     154.035     170.996     168.363     176.326     191.553     175.608        264.969        326.704        320.641        267.623        358.865        390.879   
Sugar   160.769     182.446     222.808      222.460     231.715     242.927     187.262     234.351     258.265     417.316     556.587        700.033        897.404     1.181.537     1.070.573        946.847        808.320   
Wheat CBT   119.787     115.090     126.858      153.232     162.810     174.670     172.180     143.667     140.921     187.586     289.121        493.783        505.416        469.831        409.531        573.146        563.125   
Wheat KZ     37.988       39.560       48.458        59.355       76.162       80.722       84.997       87.397       75.503       76.958       97.925        158.947        142.932        111.210        105.621        189.135        183.571   
 -
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In this period, one can identify two main sub periods, being 2004 the turning point. Until the 
beginning of 2004, the agricultural commodities presented a stable tendency, with all trading 
relatively similar amounts of open interest, excepting corn. Noting that throughout the sample 
period corn traded significantly large amount of positions. On the contrary, the second half of the 
period is less steady. By 2004 there was an increased amount of open interest and greater 
variability. In particular, sugar and corn presented from that moment an unstable evolution. Until 
2007, on average, the open positions continued to rise, registering a peak by the end of that year. 
Though between 2008 and 2009 there was a decreasing period. This refers to the need of liquidity 
which had caused the close of positions. Moreover, the financial crisis ultimately boosted 
variability on commodity derivative market. Indeed, 7 out of 12 agricultural commodities 
registered in 2008 the largest intra-year variability. Hence, until the end of 2010 it is be difficult to 
find a trend across agricultural commodities. However, in the beginning of 2011, there was a 
general decrease on total open interest. But it may be too soon to suggest a return to unwavering 
periods as in previous decades. 
 
4.2. The role of Index Traders 
In this subsection the data form the CIT report will be analyzed from 2006 until the 14
th
 week of 
2012 for all the agricultural commodities. CIT report provides information on the total amount of 
positions, their weekly variation and the percent of open interest per each category of trader 
(commercial long, commercial short, noncommercial long, noncommercial short, noncommercial 
spreading
8
, index trader long, index trader short, non-reportable long, non-reportable short). This 
report also gives information about the total number of traders in each reportable category.  
 
Sanders et al. (2010) compare the COT and the CIT reports and concluded that index traders were 
mainly considered as commercial traders on the first report. There were only 15% of long index 
investments that came from noncommercial positions. This occurs because commercial investors 
on COT report include dealers that instead of physical hedging are devoted to financial purposes. 
These commercial COT positions that are after assigned to index traders’ position in CIT report 
                                                          
8
 CFTC (2008) defines Spreading as “(…) measures the extent to which each non-commercial trader holds equal 
combined-long and combined-short positions.” 
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will henceforth be referred to as commercial financial positions. These commercial financial 
positions may be interpreted as errors of categorization on COT report.  
The paper will thus update the analysis of Sanders et al (2010) to the most recent period to 
confirm the previous findings. The Table 5 compares the proportion of the commercial financial 
positions both on index traders CIT positions (panel A) and on the total commercial COT 
positions (Panel B). Since short index traders positions are irrelevant, the analysis just focus long 
positions. 
 
Table 5 – Percentage of commercial financial positions on long index traders and total 
commercial COT positions between 2006 and 2011 
 
 
Between 2006 and 2011, as in Sanders et al. (2010) study, index positions are still largely made 
up of commercial COT positions. More than 70% of index CIT positions were classified as 
commercial on COT report, excepting cocoa and feeder cattle. Yet the relative importance of 
commercial financial positions on index traders’ positions is diminishing over time.  
In addition, the data on Panel B (Table 5) indicates that a significant amount of commercial 
positions on COT report are not hedging. Lean hogs, Live Cattle and Wheat CBT are the 
commodities were the misclassification on COT report is still relevant. For instance, on Lean 
Hogs, in 2011 (on average), just 24% of the COT commercial positions were engaged on hedging. 
The remains 76% were rather intended on financial investments and then considered as index 
traders on CIT report. This scrutiny strengthens the usage of CIT report and confirms that the 
conclusions based on COT data may be imprecise and must be carefully analyzed.  
Year Cocoa Coffee Corn Cotton
Feeder 
Cattle
Lean 
Hogs
Live 
Cattle Soybeans
Soybean 
Oil Sugar
Wheat 
CBT
Wheat 
KZ
Panel A.  Percentage of long Commercial Financial positions  on long index CIT positions
2006 72% 90% 90% 91% 69% 87% 85% 89% 91% 91% 89% 87%
2007 76% 89% 89% 92% 61% 85% 84% 90% 94% 85% 87% 87%
2008 83% 91% 85% 92% 54% 86% 83% 86% 96% 84% 85% 65%
2009 74% 87% 79% 89% 55% 83% 79% 80% 87% 77% 80% 57%
2010 59% 80% 84% 86% 57% 81% 79% 84% 87% 76% 87% 67%
2011 54% 78% 81% 81% 49% 80% 78% 83% 83% 74% 86% 70%
Panel B. Percentage of long Commercial Financial positions  on long commercial COT positions
2006 11% 49% 54% 61% 42% 84% 66% 62% 48% 40% 71% 45%
2007 19% 46% 42% 59% 53% 78% 77% 40% 44% 43% 72% 45%
2008 29% 53% 42% 53% 50% 82% 78% 46% 40% 54% 80% 35%
2009 23% 52% 48% 68% 51% 78% 64% 46% 41% 42% 76% 40%
2010 24% 54% 58% 48% 49% 83% 80% 49% 55% 44% 71% 41%
2011 19% 41% 48% 41% 45% 75% 69% 41% 42% 49% 72% 40%
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The paper proceeds by focusing on index traders. The goal is to review and evaluate their 
significance in the agricultural futures markets. Following the analysis and due to the current 
discussion, index traders are expected to have a prominent participation in these markets. Firstly, 
the short index traders’ positions are residual and not relevant. In fact, these positions are even 
smaller than non-reportable positions. On average, between 2006 and 2012, short index positions 
accounted for 2.3% of total open interest. The largest short index position (12.2%) was registered 
on Sugar in 2010. In more than 3.924 observations only on 556 times, short index positions 
represented more than 5% of total open interest. Thus, index traders hold net long positions. This 
evidence further validates the main concern of those who criticize the role of index traders and 
updates the pertinence of their researches.  
Table 6 summarizes the percentage of each category of trader on total open interest per 
commodity, in the overall period. The total open interest is the sum of all long or short positions 
including the spreading. Note that the information here available may be considered a proxy of the 
volume of commodities that are internationally traded.  
 
Table 6 –Percentage per CIT category of trader on total open interest, CIT report, between 
2006 and April 2012 
 
 
The Table 6 shows that between 2006 and 2012, long index participation is, on average, higher 
than long commercial positions. However, one should interpret the data with reverse/counterpoint 
positions, meaning that the importance of long index traders’ positions should be contrasted with 
short commercial positions. In fact, on average, during the analyzed period, short commercial 
Commodity Long Short Spreading Long Short Long Short Long Short
Cocoa 23% 14% 14% 41% 66% 16% 1% 7% 5%
Coffee 16% 11% 29% 23% 55% 26% 2% 6% 4%
Corn 13% 6% 29% 22% 45% 25% 2% 11% 17%
Cotton 15% 8% 26% 21% 58% 30% 2% 8% 5%
Feeder Cattle 24% 14% 18% 15% 21% 24% 2% 18% 44%
Lean Hogs 14% 13% 25% 9% 43% 41% 1% 11% 17%
Live Cattle 19% 11% 25% 12% 45% 37% 1% 8% 19%
Soybeans 14% 7% 29% 20% 45% 26% 2% 10% 16%
Soybean Oil 14% 10% 22% 28% 58% 26% 2% 10% 7%
Sugar 12% 5% 23% 27% 58% 28% 6% 9% 7%
Wheat CBT 10% 16% 27% 13% 40% 42% 5% 8% 12%
Wheat KZ 22% 9% 15% 24% 55% 24% 1% 16% 21%
Noncommercial Commercial Index Traders Non - Reportable
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positions are significantly larger than long index traders, excepting feeder cattle and wheat CBT. 
On cattle commodities and wheat CBT both short and long commercial participations are small. 
Likewise, on these commodities long index traders and short non-reportable positions have 
significantly more importance. As a result, cattle commodities and wheat CBT may register more 
speculation activity than the remaining commodity markets.  
Before moving on an annotation must be done to feeder cattle. This commodity is clearly an 
exception since a significant proportion of its open interest is hold by non-reportable traders, 
whose purposes are unknown. The study on feeder cattle commodity may be inconclusive and 
henceforth this product will have marginal value. 
 
Following, noncommercial traders are other type of financial traders. However, noncommercial 
positions may be less harmful than index traders since their net long positions are smaller (except 
for cocoa, during the sample period). In addition, according to CFTC noncommercial traders are 
less insensible to market fundamentals and this may be the reason why they are receiving less 
attention. 
 
Focusing on index traders, the Chart 3 resumes the data of long index traders open interest 
between 2006 and 2012. 
 
Charter 3 – Long index traders open interest, CIT report between 2006 and April 2012 
 
 
The sample period shows frequent changes. Despite the different trading volumes, there is a 
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similar pattern across the 12 commodities from 2007 to 2009. The total amount of open positions 
increased on average until mid-2008. Thereafter the open index interest decreased, sharply in 
some commodities until 2009. In the beginning of 2010, index long positions still registered 
sizeable oscillations but tended to return to a stable pattern. Corn is an exception. This food staple 
has been, on average, the most traded commodity by index traders and it is also, as noted 
previously, the most traded commodity in agricultural futures markets.  
 
Despite index traders’ goal and their ability to flow between markets, index traders’ positions 
have not been fluctuating as much as commercial positions. The Charts 4 and 5 illustrate the 
weekly changes on long index and short commercial positions, from 2006 until April 2012 to the 
most liquid agricultural commodity markets: corn and sugar.  
 
Charter 4 – Weekly changes on corn long index traders’ positions and short commercial 
positions, CIT report between 2006 and April 2012 
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Charter 5 - Weekly changes on sugar long index traders’ positions and short commercial 
positions, CIT report between 2006 and April 2012 
 
 
Contrary to what would be expected short commercial positions present larger weekly variability 
than long index positions. This would not be predictable since commercial traders may present a 
stable hedging pace whilst financial investors and particularly index traders are being accused of 
generating variability (even though index traders are described as long term investors). 
The changes on commercial short positions may not only exonerate speculators for being 
variability’s culprits but further suggest that fluctuations would be primarily driven by 
commercial investors. Nevertheless it is questionable the nature of all these changes and its 
reasonability may require further investigation.  
 
Furthermore, an additional concern addressed by some authors has to do with the significant 
amount of money and contracts each index trader hold, on average. Table 7 presents the Traders 
and Positions decomposition per category of trader, CIT report between 2006 and April 2012. 
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Table 7 – Traders and Positions decomposition per category of trader, CIT report between 
2006 and April 2012 
 
 
Commodity Long Short Spreading Long Short Long Short
Panel A - Average number of traders
Cocoa 54           37           39            39           43           20           5           
Coffee 124         83           105          100         112         24           8           
Corn 198         149         250          254         330         26           15         
Cotton 107         60           79            55           60           24           9           
Feeder Cattle 35           30           33            32           48           18           3           
Lean Hogs 71           67           90            33           51           23           7           
Live Cattle 99           73           102          84           151         24           6           
Soybeans 148         117         182          111         161         25           13         
Soybean Oil 62           51           70            52           58           20           8           
Sugar 69           47           75            69           74           24           13         
Wheat CBT 102         132         152          70           101         27           15         
Wheat KZ 48           25           40            49           68           18           5           
Panel B - Average position size (contracts)
Cocoa 35 194    22 558    22 028     63 806    102 919  24 463    1 927    
Coffee 28 635    18 568    51 871     41 558    97 854    46 357    2 719    
Corn 239 166  100 732  515 264   374 413  786 183  419 887  43 547  
Cotton 41 096    21 348    77 619     60 877    163 025  80 538    6 092    
Feeder Cattle 9 120      4 819      6 790       5 214      7 691      8 484      615       
Lean Hogs 31 738    27 308    55 863     19 112    96 355    87 793    3 251    
Live Cattle 63 621    32 976    83 241     37 807    149 660  119 991  3 248    
Soybeans 93 711    42 527    190 496   125 111  293 368  165 627  15 855  
Soybean Oil 47 517    31 274    72 144     89 325    189 619  83 856    7 697    
Sugar 107 960  45 661    219 407   251 684  542 640  264 693  58 896  
Wheat CBT 52 971    80 105    134 731   66 289    204 481  211 541  23 668  
Wheat KZ 33 785    12 095    22 015     35 083    83 011    34 423    1 918    
Panel C - Average contracts per trader (Panel B/Panel A)
Cocoa 647         602         572          1 640      2 378      1 247      357       
Coffee 231         224         495          415         872         1 907      359       
Corn 1 207      676         2 063       1 472      2 386      15 990    2 876    
Cotton 384         356         982          1 103      2 734      3 354      699       
Feeder Cattle 259         163         208          164         160         472         179       
Lean Hogs 445         409         623          579         1 879      3 845      493       
Live Cattle 643         450         817          448         990         4 905      503       
Soybeans 632         364         1 048       1 132      1 826      6 503      1 212    
Soybean Oil 768         611         1 025       1 730      3 246      4 290      964       
Sugar 1 559      964         2 918       3 666      7 351      11 178    4 588    
Wheat CBT 518         607         886          943         2 033      7 974      1 591    
Wheat KZ 710         477         549          715         1 229      1 958      421       
Noncommercial Commercial Index Traders
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As noted on Table 7, the number of index traders on agricultural derivative markets is remarkably 
smaller than noncommercial or commercial traders. In corn, for instance, long positions held per 
index trader were 6.8 times larger than short positions held per commercial trader. This evidences 
the huge amount of money each index trader has to invest in commodity derivative markets. 
Indeed, this may be what worries bubble defendants the most. On the one hand, index traders are 
able to negotiate individually large volumes of positions. Whilst on the other hand, with the 
exclusive purpose of profiting, index traders can freely move between commodity markets. As a 
result, speculators’ criticizers argue that each time an index investor decide to invest or disinvest 
in a specific commodity, he can, by his own, disturb the equilibrium and drive prices up. 
Moreover, index traders decisions may not be anticipated which causes an additional source of 
concern.  
 
In summary, despite the latter analysis, the paper will apply a theoretical method that would 
measure the relationships between the different investors. Sanders et al (2010) applied Working’s 
speculative index on CIT report between 2006 and 2008. This may be seen as an extend work for 
Sanders et al. (2010) research and will just serve as a barometer to know if their results still stand 
for the most recent data or if it is necessary to run further tests.  
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5. Methodology  
This section introduces the methodology that was also used by Sanders et al (2010). Next it will 
present the main weaknesses of this methodology, shown on non-reportable positions and the 
approaches to overcome it. It then evaluates the accuracy and timeliness of the previous debate. In 
second phase it suggests new methods to treat currently non-reportable positions. The last sub-
section presents the difficulties in applying Working’s methodology to the CIT report. Hence two 
possibilities will be suggested: one designed by Sanders et al (2010), and a new one that results 
from a traders categories’ rearrangement. 
5.1. Working Speculative index  
Since the beginning of commodity derivative markets, there are research works that analyze the 
role of speculation on future contracts and its relevance as a counterpart to hedging positions. 
While profit was the speculators motive to trade agricultural future contracts, based on statistical 
results, they were only willing to trade on commodity derivative markets when there was a 
significant amount of hedgers and low commission rates. This fact suggested that future markets 
were hedging rather than speculative markets (Working, 1960 and Peck 1982). 
 
Particularly noteworthy in this context is the contribution of Working (1960) that proposes an 
innovative technique to evaluate the importance of speculation relatively to hedging. The analysis 
is focused on the total amount of open interest hold per each trader class. According to Working 
(1960) “the only aspect of speculation that is really observable is the transaction by which a 
speculator initiates or closes out a speculative venture. This is also the only aspect of speculation 
in future concerning which any statistics were regularly published prior to July 1923.”9 Therefore, 
Working (1960) noticed that “to learn how much speculation is connected with hedging it is 
necessary to find out what proportion of total speculative open contracts is needed to carry the 
hedging open contracts.”10 
 
To further support his analysis, Working (1960) developed a Speculative Index that aims to 
measure this relationship. Firstly, the author argued that speculators frequently take major 
                                                          
9
 Working (1960, pp 190) 
10
 Working (1960, pp 190) 
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positions on just one side (either long or short) based on their long-term judgment. In addition, he 
verified that speculators were mainly concentrated on the long side. Working thus started to 
design a model where there were no long hedging positions. So if speculators would mainly trade 
on the long side of the market, they would have to be large enough to stand as counterpart to both 
short hedging and short speculating positions [         ]. Therefore Working’s index, 
referred as T, would be the ratio that would determine the excess of speculation to short hedging 
positions.  
  
  
  
 
     
  
   
  
  
  
     
 
 
In this case, the speculative ratio ( 
  
  
 ) would equal the index ratio. However, hedgers also hold 
long positions. The goal was then to relate speculation and hedging. Working had to refine the 
analysis to incorporate both long and short hedging and speculation positions. The author 
managed to do so by correlating the long (short) hedging and long (short) speculating positions to 
short (long) hedging positions, if short (long) hedging would be larger than long (short) hedging. 
In sum, Working (1960) related speculation and hedging ratios, respectively: 
  
  
 and 
  
  
 .  
To perform the analysis Working used the open interest average data published by CFTC from 
1954-59 for 11 agricultural commodities. In addition, Working verified that commodities 
presented different characteristics. This led the author to divide commodities into three different 
groups according to their traders’ characteristics and to perform, individually, group analysis. 
Nevertheless, Working (1960) noted the three groups presented the same relationships between 
hedging and speculation ratios, which would be represented through the following equation: 
   (   )   (   )  , where α would be the “speculative characteristics common to each 
group (…)” of commodities.  
The total amount of long positions would equal the total amount of short positions. Therefore, 
           . 
As a result, relating the former equations Working (1960) concluded that 
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     (     )     
  
     
.  
Recalling the previous Speculative Index, where     , the α parameter would be identifiable as 
being:   
  
     
 
  
  
    . So, when     , the Speculative Index derived by Working’s 
(1960) is: 
                      
  
     
  when        
                      
  
     
  when        
 
An index value of 1, means that the speculation positions on one side of the market are in the 
exact amount of the net open commercial positions. Any value different from one indicates that 
those trade positions are not balanced. 
Working (1960) run the Speculative Index for the period between 1954 and 1959 and for 11 
agricultural commodities and found a frequent small excess of speculation. Working (1960) 
understood that an additional amount of speculation was a necessary condition not only to 
guarantee the speculators’ participation in these markets but also to serve as a limiter to price 
deflation since hedgers mainly hold in short positions. In addition, Working (1960) also suggested 
that the amount of long speculation would be directly influenced by the amount of short hedging 
while short speculation positions would depend on long hedging contracts, confirming that 
commodity derivative markets are principally hedging markets.  
 
Although, the index is easy to use, it just deals with reportable positions, held by identified traders 
serving specific purposes. But if traders hold an amount below which no declaration of interest is 
required, it is impossible to categorize them as speculators or hedgers. Working (1960) considered 
the ratio of reportable positions as a good proxy of total (reportable and non-reportable) open 
interest. However, in 1960 the non-reportable positions accounted for a significant proportion of 
total open interest. Therefore, the major weakness of Working’s Speculative Index was the 
disregard for the allocation of the non-reportable traders. The larger the non-reportable positions 
were, the greatest its importance would be. Currently, although there are still non-reportable 
positions, they are less significant. Nevertheless, the market became more complex and additional 
limitations to apply the Working’s T arise. A specific difficulty concerns the current category of 
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traders in CIT report. Both the weaknesses will now be further detailed.  
5.2. Non-Reportable Positions: the major weakness  
Several authors propose different methods to correctly allocate non-reportable position on 
speculators and hedging contracts. Larson (1961), Rutledge (1977-78) and Peck (1982) are among 
these researchers who suggest a methodology to apply to COT reports. In order to do so they used 
additional information – full market surveys 11– published by CFTC, detailing the nature and 
purpose of non-reportable traders. Otherwise it would be impossible to reach any conclusion.  
 
Larson (1961) started to address the problem immediately after the publication of Working’s 
(1960) research. Through the analysis of 26 full market surveys, Larson (1961) concluded that 
both hedging and spreading positions would be firstly estimated to ensure the balance of long and 
short spreading positions. The residual positions would thus be allocated to noncommercial 
traders. Larson (1961) highlighted some estimating errors that could arise from his model. Some 
commodities may not be comparable and his model is based on 26 reports which do not provided 
data on all the analyzed commodities. Therefore Rutledge (1977-78) presented a new allocation 
process that intended to estimate the non-reportable classifications using new data. This model 
omits the spreading (matching in Rutledge work) category on a first step, being just filled with the 
surplus, after distributing the positions over speculators and hedging contracts (Rutledge, 1977-
78). This may lead to a situation where long matching positions differ from short matching 
positions, which by definition cannot occur. In fact, this is the major weakness on Rutledge work. 
In this context, Peck (1982) presents a third approach to treat non-reportable positions.  
Peck’s model introduces two new variables that aim to differentiate commodities by its perishable 
condition and its reporting limits. This decision was based on Larson (1961)’s conclusions since 
in this latter model the perishable and storable commodities presented different matching 
positions. Moreover, Peck (1982) suggested that the differences on reporting and speculative 
limits over time and across commodities may also affect the allocation system. The author, thus, 
introduced a variable that compensates those differences in order to uniform and compare the 
results. The method is then constructed respecting certain ranges which also allowed Peck (1982) 
to avoid Larson’s and Rutledge methodology problems. As the others, Peck (1982) also based its 
                                                          
11
 CFTC does not publish these reports anymore. 
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method comparing the full market surveys and the COT report.  
 
Nevertheless, Peck (1982) suggested that market developments will increase the reportable 
hedging positions and non-reportable positions would mainly be associated to speculation. 
Additionally, the author realized that commodity derivative market had been modifying and thus 
the previous full market reports would not represent future markets’ contexts (Peck, 1982). 
Therefore, performing recent data analysis with methods that were based on those reports may not 
be feasible. Rutledge (1977-78) also emphasis that in absence of further information on non-
reportable traders it would be acceptable to assume that those positions would have the same 
composition as reportable ones. 
 
According to the CFTC, currently, between 70% and 90% of total position are reportable. Yet 
20% of non-reportable data is still a significant volume that may bias the analysis on traders and 
positions. Charter 6 and Table 8 evidence the decreasing percentage of non-reportable positions 
on total open interest.  
 
Charter 6 – Percentage of short non-reportable positions on total open positions, COT 
report between 1995-2011 
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Table 8 – Percentage of non-reportable positions, COT report between 1995-2011 
 
 
Both Charter 6 and Table 8 show that although the decreasing trend, there are commodities where 
non-reportable traders still hold a considerable percentage of the total open interest. The 
differences on reporting limits may explain the discrepancy across commodities and over time. 
CFTC changes the reporting limits according to the tradeoff between the need of information and 
Commodity Cocoa Coffee Corn Cotton
Feeder 
Cattle
Lean 
Hogs
Live 
Cattle Soybeans
Soybean 
Oil Sugar
Wheat 
CBT
Wheat 
KZ
Panel B. Percentage of Long Non-Reportable Positions
1995 23% 28% 29% 15% 59% 43% 38% 37% 33% 33% 38%
1996 23% 36% 26% 20% 56% 44% 41% 34% 35% 31% 35% 38%
1997 17% 30% 29% 21% 43% 33% 37% 33% 32% 30% 34% 37%
1998 12% 27% 25% 19% 45% 28% 31% 28% 25% 23% 33% 25%
1999 17% 20% 21% 19% 33% 21% 22% 25% 15% 21% 27% 19%
2000 21% 17% 22% 16% 22% 22% 19% 31% 18% 18% 28% 25%
2001 9% 18% 20% 15% 23% 24% 20% 28% 16% 21% 24% 29%
2002 7% 18% 21% 14% 31% 29% 25% 23% 18% 23% 23% 25%
2003 6% 17% 19% 11% 25% 23% 22% 20% 17% 21% 19% 18%
2004 7% 13% 15% 8% 24% 20% 17% 22% 15% 17% 15% 20%
2005 7% 9% 17% 12% 18% 16% 12% 19% 15% 15% 11% 19%
2006 8% 9% 13% 10% 19% 12% 11% 15% 11% 12% 8% 19%
2007 8% 6% 11% 8% 18% 11% 9% 12% 10% 10% 8% 17%
2008 7% 5% 9% 6% 15% 10% 7% 10% 9% 9% 7% 17%
2009 8% 6% 10% 8% 24% 13% 9% 10% 11% 8% 8% 17%
2010 6% 5% 9% 7% 16% 10% 7% 8% 9% 9% 7% 12%
2011 6% 5% 10% 6% 17% 10% 7% 8% 9% 10% 8% 14%
Panel B. Percentage of Short Non-Reportable Positions
1995 13% 21% 34% 17% 61% 46% 32% 27% 26% 32% 38%
1996 12% 25% 34% 16% 56% 65% 42% 25% 24% 23% 27% 33%
1997 11% 23% 36% 16% 55% 36% 37% 28% 20% 19% 24% 32%
1998 12% 21% 33% 12% 44% 34% 32% 28% 15% 20% 21% 23%
1999 10% 14% 31% 13% 52% 29% 33% 23% 15% 16% 19% 20%
2000 4% 10% 24% 9% 58% 30% 30% 19% 13% 11% 17% 17%
2001 5% 8% 23% 10% 57% 36% 29% 17% 11% 17% 15% 17%
2002 5% 8% 21% 7% 44% 37% 30% 17% 9% 11% 16% 18%
2003 6% 8% 22% 7% 51% 30% 29% 17% 9% 12% 17% 18%
2004 5% 6% 19% 6% 52% 28% 23% 22% 10% 9% 14% 20%
2005 4% 6% 25% 8% 49% 30% 26% 26% 10% 9% 14% 22%
2006 5% 6% 20% 7% 44% 23% 24% 23% 8% 9% 13% 21%
2007 4% 4% 17% 4% 48% 17% 20% 16% 6% 8% 13% 22%
2008 4% 4% 14% 4% 40% 14% 19% 15% 6% 6% 12% 26%
2009 4% 5% 19% 5% 40% 17% 17% 16% 9% 6% 12% 23%
2010 5% 4% 18% 4% 46% 16% 18% 15% 7% 6% 11% 17%
2011 4% 4% 14% 5% 47% 15% 17% 11% 8% 8% 11% 16%
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the cost of reporting. The last adjustment on reporting limits occurred in 2005 and this may be the 
reason why, since 2006, the non-reportable positions on agricultural commodities have been 
relatively stable (Table 8). The only exception is the feeder cattle positions, particularly the short 
positions that remain quite high. Although there was a decrease since 1995, the non-reportable 
feeder cattle positions still account for about 50% of total short positions. Nevertheless, the 
justification cannot lay on reportable limits because CFTC could raise them to understand the 
nature of those traders.  
Moreover, there are still some differences on long and short non-reportable positions across 
commodities. While on grain and soft commodities those differences tend to be small, on cattle 
commodities, non-reportable positions are predominantly short positions.  
 
In sum, despite non-reportable positions have relatively importance in some commodities, it is 
impossible to know their motivation. The last full report to be published was in 1971. Due to the 
absence of additional information on non-reportable positions and to the significant market 
changes, this paper will neutralize their participation by assuming that their relative weights are 
similar to those in the reported positions. Noting that allocating non-reportable positions with the 
same distribution pattern of reported positions it is similar to excluding them. Later, in the two 
scenarios the reportable weights will be maintained. Sanders et al (2010) decided to distribute 
non-reportable positions across commercial, non-commercial and index traders’ positions 
according to their proportion on total reportable positions.  
 
Nevertheless, one may argue that it would be more correct if conduct this allocation regarding 
also spreading positions. Although spreading is internally offsetting and is not accounted on 
Working’s Speculative Index, there might be non-reportable positions that belong to spreading 
category. Following this approach and to ensure the spreading category equilibrium, it will first 
allocate non-reportable positions to spreading positions. Since spreading positions have different 
weights on long and short total reportable interest, non-reportable positions will be allocated to 
spreading according to its (spreading) proportion on total open interest. Once long and short non-
reportable positions differ in size, this method will apply the former proportion to the smallest 
non-reportable position: either long or short, guarantying thus the same amount of non-reportable 
positions on spreading. The remaining non-reportable positions would then be distributed over 
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commercial and non-commercial traders.  
5.3. Applying Working Speculative Index to the CIT report 
Currently, the CIT report presents the most accurate data to study the role of speculation on 
agricultural commodities. However, in 1960 there was just the COT report which only included 
two categories of reporting traders. Therefore Working’s Speculative Index only identifies 
commercial and noncommercial investors. The markets became more sophisticated and therefore 
the market statistics currently include an additional category of traders. As mentioned before, CIT 
report identifies reportable positions as noncommercial, commercial and index traders. In order to 
apply Working’s Speculative index using CIT report, some adjustments have to be made. There 
would be two possibilities.  
 
(1) Following Sanders et al (2010) procedure, the first possibility would be to assume speculators as 
the sum of noncommercial and index traders, since they are both engage on financial transactions. 
The following section will update the work of Sanders et al (2010) and evaluate if their 
conclusions are still valid.  
 
(2) An alternative method to isolate index traders would be achieved by rearranging the categories of 
traders. 
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6. Working’s Speculative Index  
This section applies the Working’s Speculative Index to the CIT report with the modifications 
described in the last chapter. It presents and analyzes two different approaches. The first approach 
is updating the work of Sanders et al (2010), considering financial traders (non-commercial and 
index traders) as speculators. The second approach is a new perspective, isolating index traders.  
6.1. Revisited Speculative Index (Speculators: Noncommercial and Index traders) 
The study conducted by Sanders et al (2010) revisited Working’s Speculative Index considering 
speculators as the sum of noncommercial and index traders and hedgers as commercial traders. 
The non-reportable positions approach highlighted in Sanders et al (2010) will be allocated to 
commercial, non-commercial and index traders’ positions.  
                 
                        
                     
                 
                
 
           
           
 
                              
       
     
       
Sanders et al (2010) computed the T index with both CIT and COT report. Despite the 
equivalence of the total open positions on CIT and COT reports, the T index results on the 
coincident period (2006-2008) were not equal, due to the misclassification on COT report, as 
explained in section 4.2. It is therefore important to take this into consideration when comparing 
the Working’s T index with previous researches. The Speculative Index using CIT report is 
higher. Yet, in both cases – using COT and CIT reports - Sanders et al (2010) concluded that the 
Speculative Index in the most recent period range similar levels to earlier periods. The results 
were compared with several studies and several sub-periods. The authors concluded that even 
after re-categorizing traders and their positions, there is no evidence of an increase in speculation. 
Although index traders increased their participation, in number of positions, on agricultural 
commodity future markets, hedgers had done the same. This explains a similar Speculative Index 
over time.  
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On may use then Working’s methodology to update the work of Sanders et al (2010) to the most 
recent period, between 2006 and April 2012. Accordingly, this may be done using CIT report. As 
it was the case for Sanders et al (2010) work, allocate non-reportable positions are allocated to 
commercial, non-commercial and index traders’ positions. It is important to note, that as 
suggested on the previous section, this paper will also perform the Speculative Index by allocating 
non-reportable positions to all reportable positions (commercial, noncommercial, spreading and 
index traders’ positions). Differences between the two approaches are reported only in 
thousandths units. While the results of this second approach are summarized on Appendix 5, the 
results following Sanders’ methodology are presented in Charter 7 and Table 9 bellow. 
 
Charter 7 – Revisited Speculative Index (Speculators: Noncommercial and Index traders) 
between 2006 and April 2012 
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Table 9 – Revisited Speculative Index (Speculators: Noncommercial and Index traders) 
between 2006 and April 2012 
 
 
Updating the study of Sanders et al (2010), one may observe similar T index levels to the 2006 
and April 2012 period. The average of Speculative Index for the 12 agricultural commodities, 
between 2006 and 2012, ranged 1.22, while excluding feeder cattle the index ranged 1,19. Since 
Sanders’ result did not vary much from historical values, it is reasonable to conclude that 
speculation remained fairly stable over the years.  
 
Commodities do not present similar speculation patterns between 2006 and April 2012. All the 
relevant Speculative Index values are presented on Table 9. As highlighted, cattle commodities as 
well as wheat CBT clearly involve greater amount of speculation positions. As evidenced in 
section 4.2, long speculative positions of lean hogs, live cattle and wheat CBT account for more 
than half of total long open interest and are larger than    positions. On these commodities, index 
and noncommercial positions compensate each other. The other commodities despite presenting 
lower Working’s T levels, still suggest the existence of some speculation activity. The perfect 
match between hedgers and financial traders will occur only if the index equals one, meaning that 
speculators would only enter to compensate net commercial positions. Thus, speculators would 
Commodity
Working 
1954-58
Sanders 
2006-08 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Cocoa 1,13 1,09 1,19 1,12 1,17 1,17 1,22 1,15
Coffee 1,22 1,19 1,13 1,13 1,12 1,13 1,28 1,16
Corn 1,16 1,13 1,11 1,07 1,11 1,19 1,18 1,16 1,19 1,14
Cotton 1,27 1,20 1,28 1,15 1,11 1,10 1,07 1,12 1,20 1,14
Feeder Cattle 1,67 1,46 1,38 1,94 1,86 1,51 1,34 1,44 1,57
Lean Hogs 1,23 1,28 1,30 1,33 1,56 1,16 1,18 1,33 1,30
Live Cattle 1,30 1,18 1,21 1,30 1,31 1,12 1,15 1,21 1,21
Soybeans 1,28 1,21 1,30 1,07 1,11 1,15 1,18 1,16 1,16 1,16
Soybean Oil 1,14 1,09 1,11 1,05 1,10 1,20 1,19 1,19 1,27 1,15
Sugar 1,07 1,17 1,13 1,13 1,14 1,13 1,14 1,13
Wheat CBT 1,22 1,31 1,23 1,29 1,47 1,55 1,45 1,45 1,68 1,42
Wheat KZ 1,14 1,05 1,11 1,11 1,19 1,17 1,14 1,23 1,13
Average 1,21 1,27 1,20 1,18 1,25 1,29 1,20 1,19 1,28 1,22
Average* 1,18 1,16 1,19 1,24 1,18 1,18 1,26 1,19
* excluding feeder cattle
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rather be trading on long or short side, yet never on both sides of the market. However, neither the 
markets are perfectly efficient nor the information (hedgers’ interests) is instantaneously and 
publically available. As a result, it may be compulsory to have an excess of speculation on the 
market to guarantee a certain level of liquidity. This may be the reason why Working (1960) 
defended his index to be above 1. However, this does not explain differences over time.  
 
While in 2007 the Speculative index rose only for wheat, sugar, lean hogs and live cattle, in 2008, 
the same index increased in almost all commodities. The general upward tendency persisted for 
2009. In the context of financial crisis, one can question whether the increase of speculation was 
due to a growing agricultural commodities’ attraction as an asset of refuge.  
It is worth noting, however, the counter cycle evolution of both coffee and cotton speculative 
index, which level either, decreased or was maintained until 2010. In 2010 there was a general 
decline on the Speculative Index importance. Conversely, 2011 there is no clear tendency. 
Nevertheless, the current year experiences a steep rise in speculation activity in all agricultural 
commodities. Indeed, the largest index levels in the period, for several commodities, where 
registered in 2012, although 2012 contains data only for the first 14 weeks of the year (January to 
early April). The analysis will prevail if this period were to be considered a good proxy of the 
whole year. Historical data indicates that, on average, Speculative Index rose during the last four 
months of the year. By extension, if one expects a further increase in 2012 levels, 2012 will likely 
stand as the period with largest Speculative Index. 
Despite the non-linearity of Working’s T evolutions, one can also note that those periods where 
positions present high variability (2008-2009 or 2011) are also periods when, on average, 
speculation levels ranged widely.  
 
All the same, the Speculative Index may vary due to a change either on commercial and 
speculation positions (non-commercial and index traders) or on long and short sides. Table 10 
bellow illustrates such variations by presenting examples for average shifts on corn, soybeans and 
wheat CBT between 2006 and 2008 and also between 2008 and 2010. 
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Table 10 – Speculative and commercial positions for corn, soybean and wheat CBT for 
Working’s T, average of 2006, 2008 and 2010 
 
 
Although    increased on soybeans, soybeans between 2006 and 2008 Working’s T reduced. This 
evidences that an increase on speculative positions may not be analyzed disregarding commercial 
positions. In addition, between 2008 and 2010 the amount of all positions increased on both 
soybeans and wheat CBT; still the Speculative Index increased in the first and diminished on the 
latter. A study that considers exclusively financial positions may misinterpret the context. 
 
Nevertheless, the Speculative Index results may not represent an excellent proxy of current 
speculation. It was assumed that non-reportable positions had the same structure as reportable 
positions. What if all non-reportable traders are either index traders or commercial traders? This 
premise may lead to different conclusions. One could evaluate and compare both scenarios by 
running two Working’s T. Therefore, one would determine the interval in which speculation 
would be able to vary. This means that one would find the best and the worst case scenario of 
speculation in agricultural commodity markets. Below, Table 11 summarizes the results according 
to Sanders et al (2010) methodology, while Table 12 reports the results allocating non-reportable 
positions also to spreading, accordingly to the method proposed previously. 
Market Year CL ITL + NCL CS ITS+NCS Working's T
2006 84.448      50.774      110.398    24.824      1,13          
2008 56.369      81.967      107.821    30.515      1,19          
Change 28.079 -    31.192     2.578 -      5.692       0,06         
2010 57.412      58.182      90.305      25.289      1,17          
Change 1.043       23.784 -    17.515 -    5.226 -      0,02 -        
2006 127.899    198.202    226.424    99.677      1,30          
2008 123.559    279.872    353.069    50.361      1,11          
Change 4.340 -      81.669     126.645   49.316 -    0,18 -        
2010 139.237    331.910    387.197    83.950      1,18          
Change 15.679     52.038     34.128     33.588     0,06         
2006 80.950      277.641    279.938    78.654      1,23          
2008 46.181      263.909    199.979    110.111    1,47          
Change 34.769 -    13.733 -    79.959 -    31.457     0,24         
2010 94.333      329.513    268.165    155.680    1,45          
Change 48.152     65.604     68.187     45.569     0,02 -        
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Table 11 – Upper and lower Revisited Speculative Index (Speculators: Noncommercial and Index traders) ranges between 
2006 and April 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity
Cocoa 1,12 - 1,17 1,08 - 1,12 1,17 - 1,23 1,11 - 1,16 1,15 - 1,22 1,15 - 1,21 1,19 - 1,27 1,13 - 1,19
Coffee 1,18 - 1,30 1,17 - 1,24 1,12 - 1,17 1,11 - 1,19 1,11 - 1,18 1,12 - 1,18 1,25 - 1,35 1,14 - 1,22
Corn 1,07 - 1,40 1,05 - 1,29 1,08 - 1,30 1,12 - 1,49 1,12 - 1,46 1,11 - 1,37 1,13 - 1,45 1,09 - 1,39
Cotton 1,22 - 1,38 1,13 - 1,21 1,10 - 1,17 1,08 - 1,17 1,06 - 1,11 1,10 - 1,18 1,17 - 1,28 1,12 - 1,21
Feeder Cattle 1,14 - 2,45 1,12 - 2,68 1,29 - 2,99 1,25 - 2,92 1,15 - 2,68 1,10 - 2,61 1,12 - 2,95 1,17 - 2,73
Lean Hogs 1,15 - 1,75 1,19 - 1,62 1,22 - 1,60 1,30 - 1,97 1,11 - 1,44 1,13 - 1,44 1,22 - 1,60 1,19 - 1,63
Live Cattle 1,10 - 1,58 1,14 - 1,57 1,19 - 1,64 1,20 - 1,60 1,08 - 1,44 1,10 - 1,44 1,14 - 1,50 1,14 - 1,54
Soybeans 1,17 - 1,66 1,05 - 1,29 1,08 - 1,34 1,10 - 1,39 1,12 - 1,41 1,12 - 1,32 1,12 - 1,34 1,11 - 1,40
Soybean Oil 1,09 - 1,21 1,04 - 1,11 1,09 - 1,17 1,16 - 1,31 1,16 - 1,28 1,16 - 1,28 1,22 - 1,37 1,12 - 1,23
Sugar 1,05 - 1,16 1,15 - 1,26 1,12 - 1,21 1,11 - 1,19 1,12 - 1,22 1,11 - 1,24 1,12 - 1,25 1,11 - 1,22
Wheat CBT 1,17 - 1,43 1,20 - 1,53 1,32 - 1,73 1,37 - 1,80 1,33 - 1,64 1,33 - 1,66 1,48 - 1,92 1,29 - 1,64
Wheat KZ 1,03 - 1,33 1,07 - 1,39 1,07 - 1,43 1,12 - 1,49 1,11 - 1,38 1,10 - 1,34 1,16 - 1,46 1,09 - 1,40
Average 1,13 - 1,49 1,12 - 1,44 1,15 - 1,50 1,17 - 1,56 1,14 - 1,45 1,14 - 1,44 1,19 - 1,56
2011 2012 Average
Panel A.  Revisited Speculative Index - Non-reportable positions allocated to commerical, noncommercial and index 
traders positions
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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Table 12 - Upper and lower Revisited Speculative Index (Speculators: Noncommercial and Index traders) ranges between 
2006 and April 2012 
 
 
Commodity
Panel A.  Revisited Speculative Index - Non-reportable allocation accounted with spreading positions
Cocoa 1,12 - 1,17 1,08 - 1,12 1,17 - 1,23 1,11 - 1,16 1,15 - 1,21 1,15 - 1,20 1,19 - 1,26 1,13 - 1,19
Coffee 1,18 - 1,28 1,17 - 1,23 1,12 - 1,16 1,11 - 1,18 1,11 - 1,16 1,12 - 1,17 1,25 - 1,33 1,14 - 1,20
Corn 1,07 - 1,35 1,05 - 1,25 1,08 - 1,26 1,12 - 1,44 1,12 - 1,42 1,11 - 1,32 1,13 - 1,41 1,09 - 1,34
Cotton 1,22 - 1,36 1,13 - 1,20 1,10 - 1,15 1,08 - 1,15 1,06 - 1,10 1,10 - 1,17 1,17 - 1,26 1,12 - 1,20
Feeder Cattle 1,14 - 2,36 1,12 - 2,60 1,29 - 2,90 1,25 - 2,81 1,15 - 2,60 1,10 - 2,51 1,12 - 2,81 1,17 - 2,63
Lean Hogs 1,15 - 1,69 1,19 - 1,56 1,22 - 1,55 1,30 - 1,88 1,11 - 1,40 1,13 - 1,39 1,22 - 1,55 1,19 - 1,58
Live Cattle 1,10 - 1,54 1,14 - 1,54 1,19 - 1,61 1,20 - 1,56 1,08 - 1,41 1,10 - 1,41 1,14 - 1,46 1,14 - 1,51
Soybeans 1,17 - 1,60 1,05 - 1,25 1,08 - 1,29 1,10 - 1,34 1,12 - 1,37 1,12 - 1,29 1,12 - 1,31 1,11 - 1,35
Soybean Oil 1,09 - 1,19 1,04 - 1,10 1,09 - 1,15 1,16 - 1,29 1,16 - 1,27 1,16 - 1,26 1,22 - 1,35 1,12 - 1,21
Sugar 1,05 - 1,14 1,15 - 1,25 1,12 - 1,19 1,11 - 1,18 1,12 - 1,20 1,11 - 1,21 1,12 - 1,23 1,11 - 1,20
Wheat CBT 1,17 - 1,40 1,20 - 1,49 1,32 - 1,68 1,37 - 1,76 1,33 - 1,61 1,33 - 1,62 1,48 - 1,88 1,29 - 1,60
Wheat KZ 1,03 - 1,29 1,07 - 1,36 1,07 - 1,40 1,12 - 1,46 1,11 - 1,35 1,10 - 1,31 1,16 - 1,44 1,09 - 1,37
Average 1,13 - 1,45 1,12 - 1,41 1,15 - 1,47 1,17 - 1,52 1,14 - 1,42 1,14 - 1,40 1,19 - 1,52
2012 Average2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
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A brief analysis of Table 11 suggests that speculation can vary within an interval which gives 
consistency to the previous Working’s T (distributing non-reportable positions according to 
reportable weights). If all non-reportable traders would be engage on speculation, there would be 
a 25% excess of speculation on corn, soybean and wheat KZ. Still, these results are not consistent 
enough to suggest an abusive role of financial traders. Though speculation on cattle commodities 
and wheat CBT, earlier had already ranged high index values, it now largely exceeds 1. In 
addition, even if all non-reportable traders would be commercial agents, Working’s T would not 
be one and there would still be an extra volume of financial positions in agricultural futures 
markets. Even those who argue that speculation must have the sole role of matching net 
commercial positions may find that, even in the best case scenario, speculation participation is in 
fact greater than that. 
In Table 12, the upper Speculative Index will not be as higher as in Table 11. This paper argued 
above that accounting spreading in the allocation of non-reportable traders may be more accurate 
and consequently, results shown in Table 12 may be more reliable than those in Table 11. It is to 
mention that although there are similar values in both tables, differences of the two approaches are 
now noteworthy.  
 
Despite this, the methodology used by Sanders et al (2010) to evaluate “The Adequacy of 
Speculation in Agricultural Futures Markets: Too Much of a Good Thing?”, presents an approach 
by which isolate index traders role is not isolated. One simple alternative to determine the 
individual weight of each financial trader would be performing Speculative Index as   being 
either    or   . This individual analysis would be similar to the previous since it just decompose 
the numerator.  
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      Panel A    Panel B 
 
The results on Table 13 indicate which category of speculators contributes more to the previous 
Speculative Index.  
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Table 13 – Decomposition of Revisited Speculative Index by financial trader between 2006 
and April 2012 
 
 
Table 13 above suggests that current speculation would mainly be generated by noncommercial 
traders rather than index traders, since noncommercial speculative index is higher than index 
(traders) speculative index. This is due to the fact that     is residual and     is significantly 
Commodity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Panel A.  Working Speculative Index - Index Traders
Cocoa 1,00 1,00 1,02 1,01 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,01
Coffee 1,00 1,01 1,01 1,02 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,02
Corn 1,01 1,01 1,04 1,06 1,04 1,08 1,08 1,04
Cotton 1,00 1,01 1,03 1,02 1,03 1,06 1,04 1,03
Feeder Cattle 1,03 1,01 1,29 1,16 1,08 1,06 1,13 1,11
Lean Hogs 1,00 1,01 1,03 1,05 1,03 1,03 1,07 1,03
Live Cattle 1,01 1,00 1,02 1,01 1,02 1,02 1,04 1,02
Soybeans 1,01 1,01 1,04 1,05 1,04 1,07 1,07 1,04
Soybean Oil 1,01 1,01 1,02 1,03 1,05 1,05 1,05 1,03
Sugar 1,02 1,04 1,07 1,10 1,11 1,09 1,07 1,07
Wheat CBT 1,02 1,04 1,14 1,13 1,11 1,12 1,14 1,09
Wheat KZ 1,00 1,01 1,01 1,02 1,01 1,04 1,04 1,02
Average 1,01 1,01 1,06 1,06 1,05 1,06 1,07
Panel B.  Working Speculative Index - Non-Commercial Traders
Cocoa 1,12 1,08 1,17 1,11 1,15 1,15 1,19 1,13
Coffee 1,21 1,18 1,11 1,11 1,10 1,09 1,22 1,14
Corn 1,10 1,06 1,07 1,14 1,15 1,08 1,11 1,10
Cotton 1,28 1,14 1,08 1,08 1,04 1,06 1,16 1,11
Feeder Cattle 1,43 1,38 1,65 1,69 1,43 1,27 1,31 1,47
Lean Hogs 1,28 1,29 1,30 1,50 1,13 1,16 1,27 1,28
Live Cattle 1,16 1,21 1,28 1,30 1,10 1,13 1,16 1,19
Soybeans 1,28 1,06 1,08 1,10 1,14 1,09 1,09 1,12
Soybean Oil 1,11 1,04 1,08 1,16 1,15 1,14 1,21 1,12
Sugar 1,04 1,14 1,07 1,02 1,03 1,05 1,07 1,06
Wheat CBT 1,21 1,25 1,33 1,42 1,33 1,33 1,54 1,32
Wheat KZ 1,05 1,11 1,10 1,17 1,15 1,10 1,19 1,12
Average 1,19 1,16 1,19 1,23 1,16 1,14 1,21
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large. Index traders’ role may be diluted and difficult to observe through Working’s Speculative 
Index even when isolated as in Panel A-Table 13. In fact, this analysis does not measure the 
impact of net long index traders’ positions and nor their inflationary pressure on prices. 
 
However, even if one were to follow a similar approach with CIT data, he would not be able to 
isolate index traders. The data that led Working (1960) to derive his Index contained only two 
categories of traders (hedgers and speculators), while the CIT report distinguished commercial, 
non-commercial and index traders’ positions. However, by examining CIT data, one notes that as 
on Working’s period, commercial positions are still net short, making financial traders (    and 
   ) positions net long. As a result, there is evidence suggesting that agricultural futures markets 
continue to be led by hedging interests. It follows that in order to evaluate the importance of index 
traders using Working’s methodology, the categories of traders have to be rearranged in order to 
reduce relationships to a double dimension and compute an index to specifically study index 
traders.  
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6.2. Adjusted Speculative Index (Speculators: Index Traders)  
A new approach is proposed below with the goal to isolate the index traders’ intervention on 
Working’s Speculative Index. This is an easier method to use and allows us to compare the results 
with previous approaches. The main challenge is to rearrange traders’ categories. The approach 
proposed in the coming paragraphs will be based on several research studies.  
 
According to Larson (1961), there is evidence to suggest that commercial investors do not, 
generally, offset each other positions. Additionally, Working (1960) stated that “long hedgers (…) 
tend individually to have a short life”. As a result, the matching of commercial positions is 
performed by noncommercial traders. Working further concluded that “[t]he amount of long 
speculation actually present in future markets depend primarily on the total amount of short 
hedging rather than on the net short hedging positions”. Working referred here speculation as 
noncommercial traders since index traders did not yet have market relevance. Recently, the CFTC 
(2006) stated that noncommercials “(…) are generally sensitive to fundamental and/or technical 
factors that might influence price
12.” Also CFTC (2006) describes noncommercial and 
commercial traders ‘s activity as “ (…)convey(ing) information about market conditions in the 
underlying cash market. However, commodity index trading has presented a third general purpose 
for trading in futures markets, i.e., to gain long-side exposure to a broad index of commodity 
prices as an asset class
13
.” In view of these conclusions, one may assume that long (short) 
noncommercial traders will be the principal traders to offset short (long) commercial positions. 
Thus noncommercial and commercial traders will be merged in one category, henceforth 
denominated as net market positions, and speculation will just include index traders. 
 
In regard to the other category of traders, where spreading positions are internally matched, held 
by noncommercial traders, non-reportable positions may influence the participation of index 
traders. However, non-reportable interests are unknown, making them irrelevant to the purpose of 
this research. Hence, in order, to compute a correct analysis centered on index traders, non-
                                                          
12
 CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@commitmentsoftraders/documents/file/noticeonsupplementalcotrept.pdf 
13
 CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@commitmentsoftraders/documents/file/noticeonsupplementalcotrept.pdf 
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reportable positions will, again, be allocated to reportable traders maintaining its reporting 
weights (as before the allocation will also consider spreading positions). One can rearrange 
traders’ relationships, based on the fact that the amount of long and short positions must be equal, 
as to evidence noncommercial traders as the main counterparts of commercial positions as 
following:  
                     .  
Consequently, regrouping traders according to their perception of market fundamentals we would 
have 
                                    
                                    .  
Resulting on             .  
 
This simple reorganization will reduce the analysis to 2 dimensions and facilitate the focus on 
index traders. Nonetheless, noncommercial traders are not neglected in the isolation of index 
traders. One can expect the nonexistence of additional speculation when     and      This 
means that when         ,      and since     is residual,    would offset  . In this 
case not only    but also     positions are essential to guarantee the clearing of all   positions.  
On the contrary, speculation would exist if      or /and     . If      then the market 
would have an excess of speculation since     will match    . The same rationale is applied 
when     . In fact, the worst case scenario of excess speculation would occur when both    
and   are significantly negative.  
 
Applying this procedure to CIT report from 2006 to April 2012, several conclusions can be drawn. 
The results are presented on Table 14. 
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Table 14 – Long and short net market positions per year, CIT report, between 2006 and 
April 2012 
 
 
First,    are always larger than   . This clearly shows that net market positions are net short, 
explaining why index positions are net long. 
Further to this point,   are always positive, with the sole exception of feeder cattle (although not 
visible in annual average values). This suggests that long noncommercial positions are not 
sufficient to offset short commercial positions and that subsequently, index traders serve as 
counterparts to these positions and their participation is crucial for risk transference among agents.  
Thirdly, there are some commodities – wheat CBT and cattle commodities - where    are 
negative (      ). In these commodities, long index positions would be matching other 
financial positions. In such cases alone one may expected an excess of speculation in agricultural 
futures markets, which is compatible with previous results.  
Commodity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Panel A. Long Net Market Positions - ML
Cocoa 59.858     48.800     29.408     36.391     35.149     58.148     58.052     
Coffee 11.119     19.244     29.724     22.874     26.001     40.163     26.356     
Corn 236.436   409.304   427.258   194.585   160.795   343.892   240.760   
Cotton 3.801       34.305     68.649     22.322     68.811     68.711     30.991     
Feeder Cattle 1.413 -      2.547 -      7.863 -      4.916 -      3.648 -      194 -         3.651 -      
Lean Hogs 13.051 -    14.193 -    21.480 -    23.069 -    2.320 -      91            10.000 -    
Live Cattle 12.236     9.001 -      21.539 -    10.203 -    1.643       15.205     13.739     
Soybeans 33.305     115.855   88.798     71.016     75.376     129.877   100.552   
Soybean Oil 51.824     83.903     89.421     50.901     48.695     77.348     32.327     
Sugar 207.655   198.032   249.313   307.694   257.692   178.973   186.048   
Wheat CBT 8.052       9.017 -      31.496 -    40.412 -    20.483 -    20.390 -    74.840 -    
Wheat KZ 27.339     24.651     27.822     14.699     30.572     35.099     16.600     
Panel B. Short Net Market Positions - MS
Cocoa 74.757     67.846     54.277     56.947     62.280     95.025     93.573     
Coffee 49.217     65.645     86.904     67.234     82.021     81.206     63.592     
Corn 699.332   815.436   823.268   524.088   670.795   751.457   639.189   
Cotton 85.756     138.272   172.315   98.805     144.845   122.191   98.702     
Feeder Cattle 6.633       7.482       1.271       3.155       5.704       10.632     3.589       
Lean Hogs 74.574     77.050     91.421     47.588     97.039     108.996   88.780     
Live Cattle 107.560   113.603   121.492   96.522     146.129   163.040   142.329   
Soybeans 169.521   287.506   254.753   216.389   270.209   305.947   281.140   
Soybean Oil 127.999   165.150   163.415   115.644   160.975   173.047   148.367   
Sugar 364.712   451.319   614.378   521.595   443.132   388.133   441.613   
Wheat CBT 221.674   192.093   149.912   126.879   203.742   198.104   148.635   
Wheat KZ 59.733     61.929     58.429     50.816     82.953     76.010     59.735     
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When       , on average,    is negative which means that index positions will be matching 
noncommercial positions. While when        and     ,    is traded against    . It follows 
that, the less residual     is, the lower the difference between    and     are and the higher    
will be. In this case, there will also be more speculation than desirably.  
 
To sum up, on general,     ,     ,       and             This suggests that index 
traders are necessary to offset commercial positions and gives support to those who claim a net 
positive influence of index traders. Nevertheless, one may find certain differences across 
commodities which are better analyzed using Working’s T.  
 
This work will apply this new rearrangement to Speculative Index as follows: 
                                
   
(      )
 when      
It can be expected here to have lower index ranges than previously but better reflecting index 
traders’ importance. Those differences may be justified by diminishing both the denominator 
            and the numerator            , while the reduction on the latter is 
higher. One may then contrast this new approach to the decomposed index on Panel B-Table 12, 
where      
   
(      )
. This latter index may lack consistency since not all the reportable trading 
categories were considered, and may thus give further support and reliability to the current index 
approach. Results from the different approach adopted will emphasize the amount of speculation 
that exceeds the net hedging needs. They are summarized on Table 15 bellow. 
 
63 
 
Table 15 – Adjusted Speculative Index (Speculators: Index Traders) between 2006 and April 
2012 
 
According to Table 15, on average, Speculative Index results are generally too close to 1 
suggesting a good balance between speculators and the remaining traders. It is worth underscoring 
that, even corn, lean hogs, soybeans and sugar present an Speculative Index below 1,10.  
Despite certain differences, between 2006 and April 2012, there was a stable growth tendency in 
Speculative Index levels, for all the agricultural commodities (except feeder cattle). In 2006 and 
2007, results were relatively low, though, there was a minimal increase in 2007 in wheat CBT, 
sugar and lean hogs. On the contrary, the Speculative Index rose considerably in 2008. Such 
occurrences are compatible to the results of the previous approach. It is noted that while coffee 
and cotton were considered outliers until 2010 based on the previous analysis, here both 
commodities present increasing Speculative Index since 2007. This may suggest that before, index 
participation was masked. In 2009, on general, the Working’s T further increased but the growth 
was not as marked, as was the case in 2008. Certain commodities decreased their speculation 
level. Again, as in the previous approach, one may question the liaison between the financial 
crisis, the benefits of investing on agricultural commodities and the increase of speculation 
activity on these commodities between 2008 and 2009.  
Nevertheless, during 2010 certain commodities increased their index level, while others reduced 
or maintained it, as in the case for coffee or wheat KZ. Still in 2011, the Speculative Index 
Commodity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Cocoa 1,00 1,00 1,04 1,01 1,03 1,02 1,03 1,02
Coffee 1,01 1,01 1,02 1,03 1,03 1,05 1,09 1,03
Corn 1,01 1,01 1,04 1,08 1,06 1,12 1,12 1,06
Cotton 1,00 1,02 1,04 1,03 1,04 1,08 1,06 1,04
Feeder Cattle 1,04 0,86 0,00 0,69 2,48 1,34 0,52 1,04
Lean Hogs 1,00 1,03 1,08 1,22 1,06 1,05 1,16 1,07
Live Cattle 1,02 1,01 1,05 1,03 1,04 1,04 1,08 1,03
Soybeans 1,03 1,01 1,05 1,07 1,06 1,10 1,10 1,06
Soybean Oil 1,01 1,01 1,02 1,05 1,07 1,07 1,09 1,04
Sugar 1,03 1,05 1,09 1,12 1,14 1,11 1,09 1,09
Wheat CBT 1,03 1,08 1,30 1,39 1,25 1,29 1,54 1,24
Wheat KZ 1,00 1,01 1,02 1,02 1,02 1,06 1,06 1,03
Average 1,01 1,01 0,98 1,06 1,19 1,11 1,08
Average* 1,01 1,02 1,07 1,10 1,07 1,09 1,13
* excluding feeder cattle
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generally followed results from 2010. Yet, in 2012, the Speculative Index increased in almost all 
the commodities. While wheat CBT, lean hogs and coffee registered the highest increases, sugar 
and cotton decreased their speculation level. It follows that, although 2012, stands as the year with 
highest Speculative Indices, such increases are not as clearly marked as they were under the 
previous approach. 
In addition, while cattle commodities ranged large values on the previous approach, lean hogs and 
live cattle range average index levels under the current context. Nevertheless, wheat CBT 
maintains its larger value and may be the outlier over the entire period. Again, this may suggest 
the presence of an excessive amount of speculators on wheat CBT. Moreover, noteworthy are the 
differences between both wheat commodities. Wheat CBT presents significantly higher and 
irregular Speculative Index levels than wheat KZ. This may suggest that index traders’ 
participation is greater on the wheat market with most liquidity. 
 
No reference was made in regards to feeder cattle, since it has an erratic market performance. As 
in the previous approach, feeder cattle commodity remains an exception due to the irregular 
composition of investors and once again, it must be carefully analyzed. On feeder cattle, on 
average,     , results in two different index occurrences. On the one hand, the index is 
negative when    is not large enough to cover a negative    (       ). On the other hand, 
even if      , the sum of       will be residually small causing significantly large and 
positive index values. Therefore, large Working’s T will not directly imply a non-residual    . 
Indeed, on average, feeder cattle     represent 1,7% of total open interest. A feasible correction 
mechanism to feeder cattle positions would be individually modeling each denominator 
constituent       
   
|  | |  |
. Though, this approach could not be generally applicable as by 
modeling it would harm the Speculative index results of the other commodities. Since feeder 
cattle commodity is not relevant to this analysis, it will be disregarded. Nonetheless, abnormal 
Speculative Index levels due to      had also occurred on Lean Hogs over 15 weeks between 
May and September 2009 and on Wheat CBT on fewer weeks.  
 
Furthermore, under this new approach, Speculative Index levels are less stable than previously. 
Charter 8 below evidences the greater variability in the Index.  
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Charter 8 – Adjusted Speculative Index (Speculators: Index traders) between 2006and April 
2012 
 
The abnormal index ranges become more evident on a weekly-basis analysis. Feeder Cattle, Lean 
Hogs and Wheat CBT are the commodities that present higher fluctuation. But lean hogs 
variability is concentrated within a limited period, around 2009. 
 
In these analysis assumes that non-reportable positions are structured as the same proportions as 
reportable positions. Still, non-reportable positions may be following either commercial, 
noncommercial and index traders’ interests. If this is the case, the conclusions would be different. 
As a result one may want to perform an additional analysis, concentrating the non-reportable 
positions either on commercial or on index traders’ positions. The analysis of an upper and a 
lower Speculative Index may allow understanding which interval between which index levels 
varies. The results are summarized on Table 16 in the following page.  
 1,00
 1,25
 1,50
 1,75
 2,00
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Cocoa Coffee Corn Cotton
Feeder Cattle Lean Hogs Live Cattle Soybeans
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Table 16 - Upper and lower Revisited Speculative Index (Speculators: Index traders) ranges between 2006 and April 2012 
 
 
Commodity
Cocoa 1,00 - 1,06 1,00 - 1,06 1,03 - 1,13 1,01 - 1,08 1,03 - 1,11 1,02 - 1,08 1,03 - 1,11 1,02 - 1,09
Coffee 1,00 - 1,16 1,01 - 1,11 1,02 - 1,09 1,02 - 1,12 1,03 - 1,12 1,04 - 1,11 1,08 - 1,20 1,02 - 1,12
Corn 1,01 - 1,46 1,01 - 1,31 1,03 - 1,30 1,04 - 1,51 1,03 - 1,53 1,07 - 1,43 1,07 - 1,53 1,03 - 1,42
Cotton 1,00 - 1,19 1,01 - 1,11 1,03 - 1,11 1,03 - 1,13 1,03 - 1,09 1,07 - 1,17 1,05 - 1,19 1,03 - 1,15
Feeder Cattle 1,00 - -7,74 1,00 - 14,81 1,07 - -6,90 1,08 - -88,14 1,04 - -2,07 1,03 - -2,06 1,06 - -2,67 1,04 - -14,73
Lean Hogs 1,00 - 2,05 1,01 - 1,87 1,04 - 1,70 1,06 - 3,46 1,03 - 1,56 1,03 - 1,53 1,07 - 1,84 1,03 - 2,02
Live Cattle 1,01 - 1,77 1,00 - 1,76 1,02 - 1,93 1,01 - 1,77 1,02 - 1,78 1,02 - 1,60 1,04 - 1,72 1,02 - 1,76
Soybeans 1,01 - 1,74 1,01 - 1,34 1,03 - 1,38 1,05 - 1,43 1,04 - 1,44 1,07 - 1,33 1,07 - 1,38 1,03 - 1,44
Soybean Oil 1,01 - 1,14 1,01 - 1,09 1,02 - 1,11 1,04 - 1,21 1,05 - 1,20 1,05 - 1,20 1,07 - 1,27 1,03 - 1,16
Sugar 1,02 - 1,15 1,04 - 1,17 1,07 - 1,17 1,10 - 1,20 1,11 - 1,23 1,09 - 1,24 1,07 - 1,22 1,07 - 1,20
Wheat CBT 1,02 - 1,37 1,04 - 1,54 1,15 - 1,92 1,16 - 2,19 1,14 - 1,68 1,14 - 1,84 1,21 - 2,46 1,11 - 1,79
Wheat KZ 1,00 - 1,50 1,00 - 1,52 1,01 - 1,48 1,01 - 1,52 1,01 - 1,39 1,04 - 1,40 1,04 - 1,48 1,01 - 1,47
Average 1,01 - 0,65 1,01 - 2,47 1,04 - 0,70 1,05 - -5,88 1,05 - 1,09 1,06 - 1,07 1,07 - 1,14
2011 2012 Average
Panel A.  Revisited Speculative Index - Non-reportable positions allocated to commerical and index traders positions
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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Although Table 16 presents a significant gap between the maximum and the minimum level of 
speculation which may be present in the market, the lower Speculative Index values are similar to 
those highlighted in the previous approach. This suggests that if all non-reportable traders were to 
be commercial traders, agricultural future markets would still register a certain level of 
speculation. It is noteworthy to remark that still the minimum level of Speculative Index is 
particularly high on wheat CBT. 
On the other hand, if all non-reportable positions were to be a mere engagement in index 
activities, the Speculative Index would increase considerably. This would then represent the 
maximum level of Speculation that would exist in the market. If so, index traders would play a 
significant role in agricultural commodities to the point that they may be able to influence 
agricultural commodities price. Lean hogs, wheat KZ, corn and soybeans are the commodities 
where the increase is more evident, while the maximum amount of speculation activity does not 
increase much in cocoa. However, one of the main criticisms to have been advanced against index 
traders is their significant amount of money and consequently, positions they invest at once 
(Kerckhoffs and Vander Stichele, 2010 and Abbott et. al, 2011). This leads to a difficulty for 
index traders to retain non-reportable positions which by nature are small. Thus this upper 
Speculative Index resumed in Table 16 may not describe the reality and its values may be under 
representative of index traders’ participation. Nevertheless, this analysis highlights the weight of 
non-reportable positions on several agricultural commodities. One may consider data presented 
above and conclude that the higher the upper Speculative Index, the greater the importance of 
non-reportable positions has on these products. 
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7. Conclusion 
7.1. Final considerations 
This research work has proposed a revisited analysis to the current debate of agricultural 
commodity derivative markets. Financial traders and most index traders are being referred to as 
the main culprits of the food price swings. A significant correlation between index traders and 
food prices would only be relevant if there were to be an excess of speculation on agricultural 
future markets. Otherwise, speculation would in fact be required as to promote market liquidity 
and risk transference. The importance of index traders is only noteworthy when compared against 
other traders’ positions.  
 
Sanders et al (2010) have addressed this topic in 2010 with 2006-2008 data from the CIT report, 
applying a traditional methodology originally proposed by Working (1960). The results of this 
research were similar to previous studies. However, derivative agricultural markets have changed 
considerably since then and a revision of the work of Sanders et al (1960) has become necessary. 
This dissertation updates the later study to the 2006- early 2012 period. The same considerations 
made by Sanders et al (2010) will be followed. Nevertheless, this paper criticized the approach 
followed by Sanders et al (2010) concerning the allocation of non-reportable traders. It explores a 
new method that will introduce more accuracy in the analysis. The method proposed the allocation 
of non-reportable positions not only to commercial – long and short, noncommercial – long and 
short and index traders – long and short positions, but also to noncommercial spreading positions. 
Spreading positions although irrelevant to the Speculative Index, influence the total amount of 
open interest that will end being allocated to commercial, noncommercial and index traders 
positions. Nevertheless, the differences between this method and the approach adopted by Sanders 
et al (2010) are minimal.  
 
The results to the update of the work of Sanders et al (1960) display an average index level of 
1.19 between 2006 and 2012, which is similar to that registered in earlier studies. More to this, 
compute an upper and lower analysis on non-reportable traders, these being either financial or 
hedger traders. For some commodities (corn, live cattle, lean hogs and soybeans) the worst case 
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scenario (where all non-reportable traders are financial traders) suggests a significant amount of 
speculators in agricultural financial markets. However, there is no way to find out who is behind 
those non-reportable traders.  
Additionally, results obtained by revising the study of Sander et al (2010) mainly depend on 
noncommercial traders, since noncommercial positions are larger than index traders’ positions. 
This approach provides insight information about the weight of total financial investors while this 
dissertation examined, in particular, the role of index traders. This work proposed a new approach 
that particularly emphasis on index traders, applying the traditional methodology of Working 
(1960). Accordingly, to perform the new approach it is required to rearrange the category of 
traders. Based on certain works (Larson, 1961; Working 1960 and CFTC, 2008) the speculation 
category includes only index traders while combining commercial and noncommercial positions 
under a different category.  
 
The results of this new approach lead to the conclusion that, on average, index traders do not play 
a significant role in agricultural commodity derivative markets. The Speculative Index ranged 
average levels below 1,10, between 2006 and April 2012, except for wheat CBT. Over time, there 
are also certain differences and 2012 appears to be the year with the highest Speculative Index 
values. Nevertheless, Working’s T levels, across commodities and over time are too close to 1, 
which is the range-level when there is no excess of speculation in the market. The results provide 
evidence to suggest that index traders’ participation on soft, cattle and grain commodity futures 
markets, exception made for wheat CBT, is required and is not necessarily excessive. The market 
needs a certain level of liquidity to guarantee its efficiency. 
Comparing the two aforementioned approaches, all relevant commodities present a similar 
evolution, except for wheat CBT and cattle commodities. Wheat CBT may however be considered 
an outlier, as the Speculative Index ranged significantly above the total average. If legal entities 
want to correct this excess, their amendment should exclusively be designed for wheat CBT. On 
the contrary, feeder-cattle commodity is not a comparable commodity due to its traders’ 
compositions and it may therefore be excluded at once from the analysis.  
 
To summarize, Speculative Index in both approaches suggested that there is no sign of a growing 
speculation since 1960, despite evident market changes. This is a relevant finding, particularly 
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given the constant appeal to further restrict index traders’ participations. The findings described 
do not shed light on whether regulations enacted throughout the years are indeed responsible for 
this stability. More to this, among the years, the amount of open interest held by speculators rose 
in line with commercial positions. This fact further shows that agricultural derivative markets are 
still primarily hedging markets. It follows that, food prices may not be increasing due to index 
traders’ positions. As a result, it remains urgent to find the main contributors of food price soars in 
order to make the appropriate provisions to fight against hunger in a prompt and adequate manner.  
 
7.2. Limitations and future researches 
Notwithstanding the contributions of the current research work, there are several limitations that 
should be mentioned.  
First of all, the CIT report only provides data to the American exchange markets. While the US 
markets are the main agricultural futures markets, there are other markets (London, Dalian) 
equally important. Moreover, the volume of commodities being traded over the counter is 
increasing and its data is not computable. As a result, the current conclusions may not be a perfect 
proxy of what is going on in the total agricultural commodity derivatives markets. In addition, the 
CIT report provides the best reliable data, yet the sample period is small and does not allow 
examination of market evolution in the long run. 
 
Equally important is the layout of feeder cattle positions. Non-reportable positions still represent a 
significant weight of total open interest. Although it has been argued that feeder cattle positions 
may be related to the amount of reporting obligation, there remain considerable clarifications to be 
made.  
 
Finally, while some authors like Masters and White (2008) argued that there is evidence to 
suggest a positive correlation between index traders’ positions and food prices, they might be 
omitting or missing relevant data. It was noted that, between 2006 and 2012    tend to be more 
volatile than    , but both are likely to have the same trend.  
This seems rare and not-expectable, since hedgers’ interest is not to profit from market 
fluctuations. This may further imply that     are likely to chase   . The fluctuation on    may not 
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only need an excess of financial investors in agricultural futures markets but also skew the results 
on index traders’ importance. If, then, index traders are correlated with agricultural commodity 
prices, as Masters and White (2008) stated, with this new information, the correlation between 
those prices and     is expected to be positive and stronger. On the one hand, it may encourage a 
re-examination of Masters’ hypothesis. Running a dual analysis with     and     to evaluate 
which of these positions is more correlated with agricultural prices. One the other hand, the 
problem of speculation may be reviewed as an issue of short commercial variability. Indeed, due 
to this unexpected variability on the CIT report, between 2006 and April 2012, observing data 
since 1995 is important. It was thus observed that since 2003 there has been an increasing 
fluctuation on short hedging positions
14
 on corn and sugar - see Appendix 6. It may be arguable 
that this phenomenon happened when index traders started to earn relevance. 
It would be important to gain more detailed knowledge of the    instability. The study would 
require further elaboration rather than a simply charter analysis. The limitations of this study here 
proposed are due to the fact that it was prepared with the weekly information published by CIT 
and COT reports.  
                                                          
14
 It is assumed that short commercial positions on COT report are less imprecise than long commercial positions 
simply because short index traders positions are residual 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – The Evolution of Biodiesel Gross Production (1000 Metric tons) 
Appendix 1 shows the evolution of biofuel production. Until 1998 the biofuel production was 
relatively low. From 2005 until 2008 (last year with available data), the production of biofuel 
increased sharply. 
 
Source – UNDATA, accessed 11thNovember 2011 
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Appendix 2 – The evolution of World Population, forecast regarding the World Bank 
medium fertility variant 
The total world population is increasing since 1950.As shown, in 2010 there were roughly 7 
billion people on Earth. Considering a medium fertility forecast, the world’s population will be 
increased to about 2 billion people until 2050. 
 
Source – DESA, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm, [Accessed 31stof 
October 2011] 
 
Appendix 3 – Methodology of S&P - GSCI and DJ – UBS Commodity Index 
The table below explains the methodology that S&P – GSCI and DJ-UBS have to follow. 
 
Source - S&P GSCI and Dow Jones – UBS Commodity Index  
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The S&P GSCI is calculated primarily on a world
production weighted basis and is comprised of the
principal physical commodities that are the subject
of active, liquid futures markets. The weight of
each commodity in the index is determined by the
average quantity of production as per the last five
years of available data. The production weights are
designed to reflect the relative significance of each
of the constituent commodities in the world
economy while preserving the tradability of the
index.
On an annual basis, weighting
restrictions are applied such that no
related group of commodities
constitutes more than 33% of the
index and no single commodity
constitutes more than 15% or less
than 2% of the index. Between
rebalancings, weightings may
fluctuate to levels outside these
limits.
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Appendix 4 - Commodities’ contract size 
The table below specifies the size of the contracts of agricultural derivative commodities. The 
current contract size backs to 1997, before corn, soybeans and wheat were traded on smaller 
contracts on future markets.  
 
  
Commodity until 1997 after 1997
Cocoa 10 Metric Tons 10 Metric Tons
Coffee 37.500 Pounds 37.500 Pounds
Corn 1.000 Bushels 5.000 Bushels
Cotton 50.000 Pounds 50.000 Pounds
Feeder Cattle 50.000 Pounds 50.000 Pounds
Lean Hogs 40.000 Pounds 40.000 Pounds
Live Cattle 40.000 Pounds 40.000 Pounds
Soybean oil 60.000 Pounds 60.000 Pounds
Soybeans 1.000 Bushels 5.000 Bushels
Sugar 112.000 Pounds 112.000 Pounds
Wheat CBT 1.000 Bushels 5.000 Bushels
Wheat KZ 1.000 Bushels 5.000 Bushels
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Appendix 5 - Revisited Working’s Speculative Index, 2006-April 2012, allocating non-
reportable positions to short and long commercial, short, long and spreading 
noncommercial and index traders positions 
Regarding the allocation of non-reportable positions on reportable ones, the paper presented a 
different approach from Sanders et al (2010). It distributes non-reportable positions on all 
reportable categories, including spreading. Since spreading implies an equal amount of long and 
short positions to match, it will first allocates non-reportable positions to spreading, according to 
the proportion on total open interest (the amount of total long reportable positions differs from 
total short reportable positions, making the spreading proportions on total reportable positions - 
long and short - different). The Working Speculative Index results obtained with this method are 
summarized in the following table. Nevertheless, the results do not vary from Sanders et al 
(2010), since the differences are only noticed on a unit of thousandths. 
 
  
Commodity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Cocoa 1,13 1,09 1,19 1,12 1,17 1,17 1,22 1,15
Coffee 1,22 1,19 1,13 1,13 1,12 1,13 1,28 1,16
Corn 1,11 1,07 1,11 1,19 1,18 1,16 1,19 1,14
Cotton 1,28 1,15 1,11 1,10 1,07 1,12 1,20 1,14
Feeder Cattle 1,46 1,38 1,94 1,86 1,51 1,34 1,44 1,57
Lean Hogs 1,28 1,30 1,33 1,56 1,16 1,18 1,33 1,30
Live Cattle 1,18 1,21 1,30 1,31 1,12 1,15 1,21 1,21
Soybeans 1,30 1,07 1,11 1,15 1,18 1,16 1,16 1,16
Soybean Oil 1,11 1,05 1,10 1,20 1,19 1,19 1,27 1,15
Sugar 1,07 1,17 1,13 1,13 1,14 1,13 1,14 1,13
Wheat CBT 1,23 1,29 1,47 1,55 1,45 1,45 1,68 1,42
Wheat KZ 1,05 1,11 1,11 1,19 1,17 1,14 1,23 1,13
Average 1,20 1,18 1,25 1,29 1,20 1,19 1,28 1,22
Average* 1,18 1,16 1,19 1,24 1,18 1,18 1,26 1,19
* excluding feeder cattle
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Appendix 6 – Weekly change on corn and sugar short commercial positions, COT report, 
1995-2011 
Appendix 6 resumes the number of contracts on corn and sugar held by short commercial 
positions, between 1995 and 2011. Since 2007, the amount of short commercial positions varies 
considerably on a weekly basis.  
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